Can the Heinrich ratio be used to predict harm from medication errors? by Taxis, K et al.
 
 
Can the Heinrich ratio be used to predict harm from medication 
errors? 
 
 
Report to the Patient Safety Research Programme (Policy 
Research Programme of the Department of Health) 
 
 
Dr. Katja Taxis 
Assistant Professor of Clinical Pharmacy and Pharmacotherapy Department of 
Pharmacotherapy and Pharmaceutical Care, University of Groningen, The Netherlands 
 
Prof. Steve Gallivan 
Director, Clinical Operational Research Unit, Department of Mathematics,  
University College London 
 
Prof. Nick Barber 
Professor of the Practice of Pharmacy, Head of Department of Practice and Policy,  
The School of Pharmacy, University of London 
 
Prof. Bryony Dean Franklin 
Director, Academic Pharmacy Unit, Hammersmith Hospitals NHS Trust & Visiting 
Professor, Department of Practice and Policy, The School of Pharmacy,  
University of London 
 
 
Competing interest of authors: None 
Correspondence to: 
 
Prof. Nick Barber  
Department of Practice and Policy 
School of Pharmacy 
Mezzanine Floor, BMA House 
Tavistock Square 
London WC1H 9JP 
 
Tel:  020 7874 1270 
Email: n.barber@pharmacy.ac.uk
 
 
September 2005Contents 
 
Executive Summary                                                                                                        6
1      Background……………………………………………………………………….           9                             
2      A review of the original concept of the “Heinrich Triangle” and its application in 
medicine………………………                                                                                         13 
2.1  The original concept of the “Heinrich triangle” ..............................................13 
2.2  The use of the concept of the “Heinrich triangle”..........................................15 
2.3  Validity and generalisability of the Heinrich triangle......................................20 
2.4  Summary.......................................................................................................23 
3  Cautionary tales concerning the heinrich triangle in relation to patient safety – 
thought experiments by a mathematician.....................................................................24 
3.1  Introduction ...................................................................................................24 
3.2  The rationale behind using the devil’s advocate role to provide constructive 
criticism.....................................................................................................................24 
3.3  The use of vignettes......................................................................................25 
3.4  Vignettes related to the use of Heinrich’s triangle.........................................25 
3.5  Summary.......................................................................................................31 
4  A graphical method for displaying safety data classified into three categories.....32 
4.1  Introduction ...................................................................................................32 
4.2  Developing a visual representation of the Heinrich ratio...............................32 
4.3  Illustration of the method in the case of A&E outcomes................................34 
4.4  Discussion.....................................................................................................35
5      An analysis of medication error data using the new graphical method…   ………36 
5.1       Background...................................................................................................36 
5.2       Data sources.................................................................................................36 
5.3       Graphical comparison of studies ..................................................................39 
5.4       Discussion ....................................................................................................45 
5.5       Conclusion....................................................................................................48
6     Road traffic accidents under the microscope…………………………………………50 
6.1       Illustrating the use of the triangular plot using road accident data................50 
6.2       Overall trends in road traffic accidents in Great Britain between 1993 and 
2003..........................................................................................................................50 
6.3      Using triangle plots to examine road traffic accident data .............................52 
6.4      Road traffic accidents and Heinrich's concept...............................................54 
6.5      Conclusion.....................................................................................................55
7     Is there a Heinrich triangle for medication errors? - conclusions and 
recommendations                                                                                                          56 
7.1     Answering the research questions..................................................................56 
7.2     A way forward.................................................................................................57 
7.3     Research recommendations...........................................................................59 
Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................60 
References ...................................................................................................................61 
Appendix 1: Mathematical proof accompanying section 3.4.5......................................71 
Appendix 2: Mathematical details accompanying chapter 4.........................................73 
Appendix 3: A commentary on medication error definitions, research methods and 
severity assessment.....................................................................................................78 
  2List of Figures 
Figure 1: The Heinrich triangle (from Heinrich’s original publication
3).........……………… 
10Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Figure 2: Ratio of different types of accidents by outcome (death, hospital admission or 
emergency department visits) taken from ecodes based on ICD9 classification 
21
..............................................................................................................................19 
Figure 3: Ratios of accidents involving firearms due to different causes (unintentional, 
assault, suicide) 
21.................................................................................................20 
Figure 4: Upper and lower 95% confidence intervals for estimate of proportion of 
serious injury accidents that result in death, given that what is observed 
corresponds to a rate of 8.3%...............................................................................28 
Figure 5: A normal distribution fitted to the birth weight of babies resulting from 
singleton pregnancies...........................................................................................29 
Figure 6: Illustrating the use of category boundaries v1 and v2 to determine which 
babies are deemed ‘normal’, ‘underweight’ or ‘grossly underweight’....................30 
Figure 7: Displaying three relative frequencies as a point within an equilateral triangle T 
in three dimensional space...................................................................................33 
Figure 8: A triangle plot of outcome data from emergency departments subdivided 
according to the nature of the admission. (The category 'mild' refers to emergency 
department visits and 'severe' refers to hospitalisation). ......................................34 
Figure 9: A triangle plot illustrating the relative frequency of different forms of 
medication error based on data from Table 7.......................................................39 
Figure 10: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken from 
Bates et al., 1995 
28 (study on adverse drug events and all types of medication 
errors) (point is almost inseparable from the left vertex).......................................40 
Figure 11: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken from 
Kaushal et al., 2001 
29 (study on adverse drug events and all types of medication 
errors) (point is almost inseparable from the left vertex).......................................41 
Figure 12: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken from 
Dean et al., 2002 
30 (study on prescribing errors).................................................41 
Figure 13: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken from 
Dean et al., 2002 (unpublished data) (study on prescribing errors)......................42 
Figure 14: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken from 
Lesar, 1997 
31 (study on prescribing errors) .........................................................42 
Figure 15: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken from 
Dean and Barber, 2000 
32 (study on administration errors) ..................................43 
Figure 16:Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken from 
Taxis and Barber, 2004 
34 (study on administration errors of intravenous 
medication) ...........................................................................................................43 
Figure 17: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken from 
Taxis and Barber, 2003 
25 (study on administration errors of intravenous 
medication) ...........................................................................................................44 
Figure 18: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken from 
van der Bemt et al., 2002 
36 (study on administration errors of all routes of 
administration) ......................................................................................................44 
Figure 19: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken from 
Hartley and Dhillon, 1998 
37 (study on administration errors of intravenous 
medication) ...........................................................................................................45 
Figure 20: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken from 
Tissot et al., 1999 
38 (study on administration errors of all routes of administration)
..............................................................................................................................45 
  3Figure 21: Annual numbers of fatal road traffic accidents for Great Britain during the 
period 1993 - 2003................................................................................................51 
Figure 22: Annual numbers of all, of minor injury and serious injury road traffic 
accidents for Great Britain during the period 1993 - 2003....................................51 
Figure 23: A triangular plot of the annual relative frequency of outcomes for road traffic 
accidents in Great Britain between 1993 and 2003..............................................52 
Figure 24: Examining the triangle plots of annual relative ratios of road accident type in 
closer detail...........................................................................................................53 
Figure 25: Triangle plots of annual relative ratios of road accident type labelled 
according to the year of the monitoring period (1993 – 2003). Successive data 
points have been joined by a line (1993=1 to 2003=11).......................................54 
Figure 26: Representing three relative frequencies as a point within an equilateral 
triangle in two dimensional space.........................................................................74 
Figure 27: Using confidence intervals for relative proportions considered two at a time 
to infer a confidence region for the relative proportions of three quantities..........76 
Figure 28: Comparison of 95% contour region derived from multinomial distribution and 
polygonal approximation (data in ratio 50:50:200)................................................77 
Figure 29: Relationships between medication errors and different types of iatrogenic 
injury (from 
50).......................................................................................................82 
 
  4List of Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Three cases to illustrate how the Heinrich triangle was established         14 
Table 2: The concept of the Heinrich triangle                                                          15 
Table 3: The use of the Heinrich triangle in various fields                                       16 
Table 4: The use of the Heinrich triangle to justify near-miss reporting                   17 
Table 5: Quotations from reports/papers to illustrate how the Heinrich triangle  
      is referred to in the medical field to justify near-miss reporting or  
      investigation of near-miss data                                                                          18 
Table 6: Classification of the outcome of patients visiting the emergency 
     departments                                                                                                        34 
Table 7: The incidence of different types of medication errors reported  
     from 12 studies                                                                                                    37 
Table 8: Example of reclassifications to establish Heinrich ratios for 
     individual studies                                                                                                 48 
Table 9: Overview of the terms used by the different disciplines/schools  
    of thought investigating medication incidents                                                       80 
Table 10: General definitions of medication errors                                                   83 
Table 11: Definitions of prescribing errors                                                                85 
Table 12: Definitions of administration errors                                                           86 
Table 13: Definitions of adverse drug reactions                                                       89 
Table 14: Definitions of a “near miss” or “close call”                                                94 
Table 15: Different types of medication error studies, with an example of  
    a study of each type                                                                                             96 
Table 16: Systems to categorise potential outcome of medication errors              104 
Table 17: Different systems to categorise actual patient outcome of 
    medication errors/adverse drug events                                                              106 
Table 18: The NCC MERP categories for patient outcome                                    107    
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  5.List of Abbreviations 
 
 
ADE: Adverse drug event 
ADR: Adverse drug reaction 
A&E: Accident and Emergency Unit 
CI: Confidence Interval 
ICD9: International Classification of Diseases, version 9 
MHRA: Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
NCCMERP: National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and  
                    Prevention   
NPSA: National Patient Safety Agency 
T: Equilateral triangle 
 
 
  
                                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  6Executive Summary 
 
 The Heinrich ratio is widely used in health and safety work; it relates the number of 
accidents that do not result in harm to the number that result in minor harm, and the 
number resulting in major harm.  Typically this is written as a ratio based on 1 case of 
major harm, for example 300:29:1. 
 
 The purpose of this study was to establish whether, for medication errors, there exists 
a fixed Heinrich ratio between the number of incidents which did not result in harm, the 
number that caused minor harm, and the number that caused serious harm.  If this 
were the case then it would be very useful in estimating any changes in harm following 
an intervention.  Serious harm resulting from medication errors is relatively rare, so it 
can take a great deal of time and resource to detect a significant change.  If the 
Heinrich ratio exists for medication errors, then it would be possible, and far easier, to 
measure the much more frequent number of incidents that did not result in harm and 
the extent to which they changed following an intervention; any reduction in harm could 
be extrapolated from this. 
 
 We formalised the properties the Heinrich ratio would require if it was to be used in the 
desired way:  the ratio would have to be stable for medication errors; we would need to 
know its values; any change in one number must be associated with a proportional 
change in the two others; there would have to be a way of constructing Confidence 
Intervals around the ratio so statistical significance of a change could be tested; finally, 
it would be preferable if it could be represented graphically to aid communication and 
understanding.  We tested whether these properties existed by a combination of 
approaches which included logic, mathematical modelling and reviewing the literature.  
These approaches are underpinned by Appendix 3, which contains a substantial 
commentary on medication error definitions, research methods and ways of assessing 
the severity of a medication error.   
 
 Using barycentric coordinates, the three numbers in the Heinrich ratio were plotted as 
a point on an equilateral triangle.  A formula was developed which allowed the 
estimation of a 95% confidence region around the point. Hence it is now possible to 
compare two Heinrich ratios and establish whether they are significantly different.  This 
has not been possible before. (Chapter 4, Appendix 1, Appendix 2) 
  7 A review of Heinrich’s original research raised significant doubts about its validity in 
complex areas such as medication error. (Chapter 2) 
 
 Logic showed that, while situations could be envisaged in which the Heinrich ratio 
remained stable after an intervention, equally there could be situations in which two of 
the numbers changed but the third did not. (Chapter 3) 
 
 Mathematical modelling showed the ratio would be exquisitely sensitive to the 
definitions used (no harm accidents, minor harm, major harm).  Depending on the 
definitions, virtually any ratio could exist.  The literature review showed the definitions 
used in the literature are widely different. (Chapter 3 and Appendix 3) 
 
 Heinrich ratios were created using data from existing papers on harm resulting from 
medication errors.  The resulting ratios were very different. (Chapter 5) 
 
 The lack of a stable Heinrich ratio for medication errors could have been due to the 
variations between definitions.  We therefore explored two other sources of health data 
in which there are well defined definitions: outcomes following A&E admissions, and 
road traffic accidents.  In neither case were stable ratios found. (Chapters 4 and 6)  
 
 In summary, we found no evidence to support a stable Heinrich ratio for medication 
errors.  However, establishing a relationship between medication errors and harm is 
extremely important.  We make some preliminary suggestions about the relationship in 
Chapter 7 and recommend the following research agenda: 
 
There is an urgent need for a common taxonomy in medication error research for 
defining, classifying, measuring and reporting medication incidents.  Journal editors 
need to be involved.  We envisage some form of consensus statement, such as the 
CONSORT statement for clinical trials. 
The relationship between errors and harm needs to be better understood.  Our work 
suggests that a simple “linear form” (halve the errors and you halve the harm) is 
probably not a reasonable supposition. This would benefit from further study and, as 
the current report shows, a multidisciplinary approach to such investigation would seem 
most beneficial. 
A risk model needs to be built relating medication error to harm.  (word count 730)     
  81  Background 
 
This project started in one place and ended, unexpectedly, in another. We start by 
explaining this change in direction. The research brief was to develop a consensus 
statement on a classification of the severity of medication errors. Medication errors are 
one of the most frequent, and severe, examples of medical error.
1;2 They are important 
in their own right, and also in that they can provide generalisable lessons for other 
types of medical error.   
 
We had planned to use a typical process of literature review, followed by presentations 
by experts to a multidisciplinary quasi-judicial panel, which would then synthesise the 
final definitions. Definitions need to allow the right amount of discrimination to serve a 
specific purpose. In order to understand the purpose for which the definitions would be 
used, we were asked to meet with Professor David Cousins, Head of Medication Safety 
at the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA). From this meeting the origin of the 
research brief was clarified as follows: 
 
The NPSA wishes to use a learning organisation approach, in combination with central 
initiatives, to create a safer NHS for patients by reducing accidental harm. To do this it 
set up a scheme to report and monitor errors. Error is a much more frequent event than 
harm. Given that any reporting system is only likely to detect a small proportion of the 
number of real events, and that harm is rarer than error, it can be difficult to 
demonstrate a reduction in harm following any successful initiative. This need not be a 
problem if there is a direct relationship between the number of errors and the number 
of harmful events. Such a relationship is described by the Heinrich ratio (usually called 
the Heinrich triangle), first described in 1931.
3 For every case of serious harm, it relates 
the number of cases of minor harm that occur, and the number of cases of erroneous 
acts that did not result in harm. This ratio is used widely in the risk management 
industry, and is routinely shown in UK health and safety documents and reports on 
incidents.  
 
 
  9Figure 1: The Heinrich triangle (from Heinrich’s original publication
3 ) 
 
The thinking of the NPSA, in line with Health and Safety Executive thinking, was that, if 
error and severity of harm could be related for a medication incident then, in future, in 
line with the Heinrich triangle definitions, the effectiveness of any intervention could be 
assessed. Medication errors are reported to the NPSA. If we could show medication 
errors were reduced by n%, then we could predict harm had also been reduced by n%. 
This thinking led to the original request to create definitions for the severity of errors. In 
order to construct the Heinrich triangle to link medication errors to harm it would be 
necessary to define the equivalents of “no injury accidents”, “minor injury” and “major 
injury”. 
 
The request seemed very reasonable, however, knowing how the definitions of severity 
would be used, we decided to formalise the questions that must be answered for the 
Heinrich triangle to deliver the required information. These were: 
 
1. Is there a Heinrich triangle (ie stable ratio) relating major and minor harm to 
medication errors? 
2. What are the values in the ratio (errors that do not cause harm: minor harm: major 
harm)? 
3. Is any change linearly proportional? For example, if the number of errors overall is 
reduced by 20%, will minor harm and major harm also be reduced by 20%? 
  104. How could the Heinrich ratio be represented graphically to illustrate and 
communicate change? 
5. How could we show that any change was statistically significant, and not the result of 
chance?  For example, is 247:28:1 significantly different to 312:25:1? 
 
In order to explore these questions we have investigated the issue using three different 
approaches: 
1. logic 
2. mathematical modelling  
3. data from the literature - empirical evidence 
 
The following report explains each of these approaches, and answers the fundamental 
questions, posed above, about the Heinrich triangle.  
 
We begin in Chapter 2 with a summary of the concept of the Heinrich triangle based on 
the original literature. We then review how the concept is understood by examining its 
usage in various fields, particularly focusing on medicine. Furthermore, this chapter 
raises questions about the validity and generalisability of the concept based on 
information in the literature.  
 
The logical and mathematical basis of the Heinrich triangle is examined in Chapter 3. 
Exemplar vignettes, based on mathematical insight, are constructed to explore 
situations in which the Heinrich triangle may be valid and situations in which there is 
clearly no basis for the concept. 
 
The next chapters of the report examine the empirical evidence of the Heinrich triangle. 
We investigate the concept using data from published medication error studies and 
from road traffic accidents. However, it was first necessary to develop a new graphical 
method to display data of three categories (minor, moderate, severe events) including 
the construction of confidence regions to allow statistical comparisons of different ratios 
(Chapter 4). The usage of this method is also illustrated in Chapter 4 using published 
data from public health.  
 
In Chapter 5 we display data from published medication error studies to investigate if 
there is a Heinrich ratio for medication errors. However, a major limitation of using 
  11existing data for such an attempt is the lack of standardisation in defining medication 
errors, data collection methods and assessment of harm from medication errors. We 
include more detailed information about these issues in Appendix 3. Further insight into 
using Heinrich's concept was gained by analysing data from road traffic accidents 
(Chapter 6).  
 
We conclude the report with a final discussion answering the research questions posed 
above (Chapter 7). 
  12 
2  A review of the original concept of the “Heinrich Triangle” 
and its application in medicine 
 
In this section we review the original literature on the Heinrich triangle from the 1930s 
and the claims for the concept. We then explore how the concept is understood by 
examining its usage in various fields, particularly focusing on medicine. Furthermore, 
this chapter raises questions about the validity and generalisability of the concept 
based on information in the literature. 
 
2.1 The original concept of the “Heinrich triangle” 
H.W. Heinrich (1881-1962) was an engineer working for an insurance company in the 
United States. He was interested in ways to reduce the number of insurance claims. 
For this purpose he studied accident records. This work resulted in the publication of 
his book "Industrial accident prevention" in 1931. This was so successful that 
subsequently further revised editions were published, some of them with other co-
authors. The last (fourth) edition was published after his death in 1980. The book 
outlines why industrial accidents occur and how these could be prevented. Ideas and 
models are mainly based on the analysis of thousands of closed-claim-file insurance 
records of industrial accidents and company records. In the following we focus on a 
concept presented in the chapter “Basic philosophy of accident prevention” which has 
consequently become known as the “Heinrich triangle” or “Heinrich ratio”. 
 
The Heinrich ratio is based on the observation that accidents which resulted in a 
serious injury or death of the employee were often preceded by similar accidents 
which, often only by chance, did not result in injury. Heinrich’s systematic analysis of 
more than 50,000 cases of accidents at work taken from company records from the 
1920s showed that on average 1 major injury was preceded by 29 minor injuries and 
300 no-injury accidents.
3 Table 1 shows examples of the cases, illustrating their very 
varied nature and ratios.  
 
 
  131. An employee took a (forbidden) short cut on his way to work, crossing a fence and 
railroad tracks every day for two and a half years (5000 times). One day he was 
seriously injured by an engine which he had overlooked because of a car which 
blocked his vision. It was estimated that he had narrowly escaped injury approximately 
500 times and had minor injuries about 38 times before his major injury. The ratio was 
therefore 500 – 38 – 1. 
2. A circular saw operator lost his thumb when, in violation of instructions, he pushed 
the board past the saw with his fingers instead of using a push stick. It was estimated 
that he had operated the machine in a similar way over 1500 times. During this period 
he had sustained many minor cuts and hundreds of 'close shaves'. Estimated ratio: 350 
– 40 – 1. 
3. A mill employee slipped and fell on a wet floor and fractured his kneecap. For more 
than six years it had been the practice to wet down too great an area of floor space at 
one time and to delay unnecessarily the process of wiping up. Slipping on the part of 
one or more employees was a daily occurrence. The ratio of non-injury slips to the 
injury was 1800 to 1. Estimated ratio was therefore 1800 – 1 – 0. 
Table 1: Three cases to illustrate how the Heinrich triangle was established 
3 
 
The overall message was that accident investigation should include the analysis of no-
injury accidents. Since there are many more no-injury accidents than major injuries, 
this provides a larger data base for accident investigations. Furthermore, accidents 
causing major injuries were often isolated events which did not give all the information 
needed to prevent similar accidents. Just studying major injury accidents would 
therefore have limited effect. This was substantiated with an analysis of 100 industrial 
plants where accident prevention work was focused on investigating major injuries. It 
was found that despite accident prevention efforts, serious injuries still occurred, 
because they were of a slightly different nature to the initial accidents. 
 
Another important conclusion that Heinrich drew from his work was that reducing the 
number of no-injury accidents was going to reduce the number of major injuries 
proportionally, because the frequency of major injuries varied directly with the 
frequency of no-injuries accidents. This also meant that corrective measures could be 
implemented even before a serious accident occurred. In summary, the three main 
statements underlying Heinrich's triangle are summarised in Table 2.  
 
 
 
  14•  There is a stable ratio of minor (no injury) to moderate to major injuries 
following accidents  
•  The investigation of minor/no-injury accidents provides valuable information to 
prevent further accidents 
•  Changes in the frequency of minor injuries cause a proportional change in 
harm 
Table 2: The concept of the Heinrich triangle 
3  
 
 
As is common for empirical work at the time, little detail is provided about methods for 
data collection and analysis which makes it difficult to judge the scientific base of this 
work by current standards. Nevertheless, the concept has been very influential and, as 
the following section shows, is referred to nearly 75 years after the first edition of the 
book. 
 
2.2 The use of the concept of the “Heinrich triangle” 
Using a similar approach “Heinrich ratios” have been established in other areas of 
health and safety and some examples have been summarised in Table 3. For example, 
one that is also widely referred to has been published by Bird and Germain.
4 They 
argued that no-injury accidents most often involved property damage. For each 
disabling injury they found 500 cases of property damage. So reducing property 
damage will also result in a reduction in disabling injuries. The concept is also used by 
the Health and Safety Executive in the UK, for example in monitoring the safety of oil 
tankers 
5 or in investigating the cost of accidents at work.
6 It has even been used to 
compare injury rates of professional footballers with rates in other areas (concluding 
that professional footballers do not have higher injury rates than people working in 
other areas 
7;8).  
 
Heinrich’s findings have also been used frequently to justify establishing near miss 
reporting systems. In this context, Heinrich's term of no-injury accidents is replaced by 
the term “near miss” referring to an incident which did not result in a harmful injury, for 
example by the Department of Transportation in the USA or the chemical industry.
9 
Table 4 includes some quotes taken from the papers to show how the concept is 
understood. Many authors state that investigating “near misses” provides valuable data 
and that there is a proportional relationship between near miss events and major 
accidents, i.e. reduction in the number of near miss events will reduce the number of 
harmful accidents.  
  15 
 
Country, year, 
reference 
Details 
  Heinrich ratios which show the frequency of incidents with 
different outcomes  
USA 1966: 
Property damage 
4 
 
Re-interprets the non-injury accidents as accidents which often 
involve property damage. To reduce property damage these incidents 
need to be investigated. Established a ratio of disabling injury : minor 
injuries : property damage accidents as  1:100:500 based on 90 000 
incidents spanning a 7 year period in a steel production company. 
USA 1996: 
Property damage 
and injuries at 
work 
10 
An analysis of 1 753 498 accidents reported by 297 companies (21 
industrial groups) to an insurance company gave a ratio of 1 serious 
or major injury : 10 minor injuries : 30 property damage accidents : 
600 incidents with no visible injury or damage.  
  Establishing Heinrich ratios to monitor safety performance 
UK, 1993: Cost 
of accidents at 
work 
6 
Heinrich ratios are established to investigate the cost of accidents at 
work 
2003, UK: Safety 
of oil tankers 
5 
Heinrich ratios are established for reported incidents with tankers. The 
data are used to monitor changes in tanker incidents over time.  
1996/1998, UK: 
Accident rates of 
professional 
football players 
7;8 
Heinrich ratios are established to compare the accident rates of 
professional football players across different football leagues (premier 
league versus first division) and with other professions.  
Table 3: The use of the Heinrich triangle in various fields 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  16 
Country, year, 
reference 
Details 
Germany, 2004: 
Government 
accident 
investigation in 
environmental 
affairs 
11 
“Lessons can be learnt from non-notifiable accidents as well as from 
accident notifiable due to German Regulation on Major Accidents and 
are independent from the consequences of the accidents. There are 
no fundamental differences in the causes of major or minor events 
too.”  
Norway, 1999: 
Near miss 
reporting in 
industry 
9  
Accident and near miss reporting data from a Norwegian oil and 
aluminium company showed an inverse correlation between the 
number of reported near misses and the number of accidents. The 
more near miss reports there were, the lower the number of 
accidents. Therefore it was concluded that the number of near miss 
reports was a good measure of the safety culture of the industry. 
“Focusing on reduction of actual near miss occurrences will reduce 
frequency of accidents.” “Iceberg concept”.  
USA, 2004: 
Department of 
Transportation 
12 
Department of Transportation (USA) Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics using Heinrich’s work to justify investigation of near miss 
accidents 
Canada 2001, 
Canadian Safety 
Council 
13 
“The bottom line is that it pays to reduce the frequency and severity of 
minor collisions. Companies that take preventive action on minor, 
non-injury incidents have fewer collisions with minor injuries, and 
fewer major crashes with severe injuries.”  
USA, 2003: Near 
miss incident 
management in 
the chemical 
industry 
14 
“In review of adverse incidents in the process industries, it is 
observed, and has become accepted, that for every serious accident, 
a larger number of incidents result in limited impact and an even 
larger number of incidents result in no loss or damage. This 
observation is captured in the well known safety pyramid.”  
Table 4: The use of the Heinrich triangle to justify near miss reporting  
 
As has been already highlighted, Heinrich’s concept is also used in medicine. Table 5 
summarises examples. Most of these use the concept to justify the use of near miss 
reporting systems. For example, in the UK, a national error reporting system has been 
established. Error reports will be used to find the general defects in the system.
15 
Individuals are encouraged to report not only errors which resulted in serious harm to 
the patient, but also potential errors or so called “near misses”. It is suggested that 
analysis and learning from near misses or no-harm accidents can help prevent serious 
injuries.
15 Because medication errors are recognised to be unacceptably common this 
concept has been particularly promoted in this area.
16  
 
 
 
 
  17 
Author and title of publication  Quotes from publication 
Bion and Heffner (2004), 
Challenges in the care of the acute 
ill 
18 
“If the Heinrich ratio can be applied to health 
care the near-miss data or latent failures provide 
a tremendous opportunity to improve patient 
safety” 
Furukawa et al. (2003) Voluntary 
medication error reporting program 
in a national Japanese University 
hospital 
19 
“According to the well-known Heinrich ratio, there 
is always a large number of similar errors that 
were able to be prevented for each case of an 
error that produces serious consequences.” 
Kaplan (2001) Lessons learned 
20  “Similarly, no-harm events provide a rich source 
of information. A consistently observed ratio of 
300:1 no-harm events (including near misses) to 
adverse events has been found in a wide range 
of industries.” 
Meyer et al. (1999) Error reporting 
systems 
21 
“Reporting systems can be evaluated on the 
proportion of minor to more serious incidents 
reported; for every major injury, there are 29 
minor injuries and 300 non-injury accidents.” 
Table 5: Quotations from reports/papers to illustrate how the Heinrich triangle is 
referred to in the medical field to justify near-miss reporting or investigation of 
near-miss data 
 
The concept has been also used to prioritise where to focus resources and services in 
accident and emergency departments in the USA.
21 The frequency of accidents were 
displayed as a ratio of accidents which result in death, hospital admission or 
emergency department visits (taken from ecodes based on ICD9 classification). Figure 
2 is an example of how the data were displayed. Ratios were compared across 
different types of injuries, for example firearms injuries and falls. Data were used to 
prioritise injury control efforts and possibly to target approaches to injury prevention 
and identify successful preventive efforts/interventions. It is noteworthy that in this 
paper a wide range of different ratios were found. Consequently, the shapes of the 
graphs deviate from the “classical” triangle. For example, the usage of firearms in 
suicide attempts results more often in death than in hospital admission or emergency 
department visits (Figure 3). High fatality ratios can therefore result in an inverted 
triangle. 
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Figure 2: Ratio of different types of accidents by outcome (death, hospital 
admission or emergency department visits) taken from ecodes based on ICD9 
classification 
21 (awaiting copyright to reproduce this figure) 
 
  19Figure 3: Ratios of accidents involving firearms due to different causes 
(unintentional, assault, suicide) 
21 (awaiting copyright to reproduce this figure) 
 
2.3 Validity and generalisability of the Heinrich triangle 
As we have shown, the concept of the Heinrich triangle 
3 has been used widely, but 
little work has been done to test its validity and generalisability by current scientific 
standards. In this respect it is useful to critically review the methods and data used in 
the original work of Heinrich.  
 
Two main concerns arise about the methods. First, the cases were a random sample of 
insurance files. This is likely to be a selected sample of cases with a major outcome, as 
only cases involving considerable (personal) damage were likely to be reported to the 
insurance company. Cases would not be reported if they were not covered by the 
insurance policy. Second, as with any document analysis, the data that Heinrich used 
were created not for research purposes or accident investigation, but for insurance 
  20claims.
22 Therefore, it remains unknown to what extent they represent “true” accounts 
of the accidents.  
 
A closer review of the characteristics of the cases indicates more restrictions to the 
possible generalisability of the conclusions. The cases as presented in Heinrich’s  
book 
3 refer to:  
 
•  industrial processes and practices of the 1920s involving relatively simple 
manual tasks.  
•  individuals deliberately deviating from known safety procedures (violations), 
such as not using the safety tools provided when operating the circular saw, or 
smoking while refueling.  
•  (failed) action or performance of one individual in one task over time. Examples 
include one worker crossing the railway tracks at a forbidden place for years, 
being slightly injured a few times and badly injured once, and the case of one 
employee of a filling station who regularly smoked during fueling until the time 
he caused a bus to explode, killing many passengers.  
 
Reviewing these characteristics raises questions as to whether Heinrich’s concept 
applies to modern industry which involves complex processes in which accidents are 
likely to involve many different operators and technologies. The concept may also not 
refer to other types of errors (eg not knowing how to carry out certain tasks instead of 
deliberately violating existing guidelines).
23 This is of particular concern as it has been 
shown recently that most prescribing errors involve mistakes (defined using Reason’s 
terminology 
23 of differentiating unintentional human errors as mistakes, slips and 
lapses. Mistakes in this context were that staff thought, incorrectly, they were doing the 
right thing).
24 Only certain types of medication errors may be related to violations, such 
as the too rapid administration of bolus doses of intravenous drugs.
25  
 
Another issue has been raised by Wright and van der Schaaf 
26 recently. For cases 
with the above listed characteristics it may be assumed that the accidents leading to 
minor/no injuries have the same causes as the major injuries (as they mostly involve 
one individual repeating the same task). This is referred to as the “common cause 
hypothesis”. Wright and van der Schaaf 
26 found that Heinrich’s concept has been 
frequently misunderstood, because studies failed to show that serious accidents had 
  21similar causes to minor accidents. In many studies, it was assumed that finding a ratio 
close to the original Heinrich ratio would be sufficient to assume that consequently the 
frequency of major injuries could be reduced by removing causes of no-injury injury 
accidents. Wright and van der Schaaf 
26 state that, to use Heinrich’s ratio in a given 
area, the common cause hypothesis has to be validated using accident or injury data 
which has been analysed for causes contributing to the incidents and not only on the 
frequency of accident severity. Their analysis of causal patterns from data from the UK 
railway industry suggested common causes contributing to minor and major accidents 
which would confirm Heinrich’s concept in that setting.  
 
There is some recognition of the importance of “common cause” in Heinrich’s books. 
The first edition contained data to show that major injuries and minor or no-injuries had 
common causes; this was omitted in further editions. The last edition of the “Heinrich” 
book in 1980 
27 even discusses an example in which Heinrich's concept does not apply. 
Data from the National Safety Council of the USA shows that, although the overall 
number of accidents had decreased, the number of accidents that caused disabilities 
had not decreased to the same extent over the years (not expected according to the 
concept). It suggested that the circumstances (and causes) surrounding severe 
accidents were different from minor injuries. In such cases the focus of accident 
prevention efforts should predict the areas of most serious injuries and try and prevent 
them.  
 
Reviewing the literature on medication errors, there is little evidence that medication 
errors with minor outcomes follow similar causal patterns to serious medication errors. 
Firstly, because few studies have formally assessed causal patterns of medication 
errors and none have analysed their data on causes by (potential) outcome. Secondly 
(and more importantly) we find many examples where errors involving certain 
medicines have little capacity to cause major injury (e.g., administration of one instead 
of two vitamin tablets on one occasion) and in contrast certain medicines if involved in 
an error will almost always have major clinical consequences (e.g., intrathecal instead 
of intravenous administration of vincristine or the repeated daily instead of weekly 
administration of methotrexate). 
 
Another point of weakness in the argument for the Heinrich triangle is that there is no 
discussion of variability. It is easy to calculate an average, but not necessarily 
  22meaningful. The ratios that are calculated for the first two cases shown in Table 1 are 
close to the average ratio of 1:29:300, in contrast, case number three has a ratio of 
0:1:1800. There may be cases in which an accident may often result in a major injury, 
such as falling from a great height. Even later work and adaptations of the Heinrich 
ratios do not include statistical considerations of confidence intervals around the ratio. 
This is particularly important if one wants to use the Heinrich ratio to determine a 
reduction in the number of accidents. When should a reduction be considered 
significant? We are not aware of anyone attempting a statistical analysis of a difference 
between Heinrich ratios.  
 
Finally, the classification into three distinct categories is also an issue. For example, 
Heinrich does not provide any definitions of how he differentiated between moderate 
and major injuries. This will clearly have an impact on the ratio.  
 
2.4 Summary 
Reviewing the original literature on the Heinrich ratio and its application in various 
fields, we find three “commonly held beliefs”. 
 
•  There is a stable ratio of minor to moderate to major injuries following accidents 
•  The investigation of minor/no-injury accidents provides valuable information to 
prevent further accidents 
 
•  Changes in the frequency of minor injuries cause a proportional change in harm 
 
Reviewing the medical literature in the area we find that there is a general belief that all 
three statements apply in medicine and we presented examples how the Heinrich ratio 
is used in public health. An in-depth review of methods used to establish the original 
ratio raises serious doubts about the validity and generalisability of the concept. With 
the exception of recent attempts in the railway industry, these questions have been 
rarely addressed.  
 
In the next chapter we will examine the logical and mathematical basis of the Heinrich 
triangle.  
 
 
 
 
  233  Cautionary tales concerning the Heinrich triangle in relation 
to patient safety – thought experiments by a mathematician 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Here, we discuss the face validity of the Heinrich’s triangle concept viewed from a 
logical perspective. In simple terms, Heinrich’s work has been used to suggest that if 
system changes are introduced that reduce the frequency of “no-harm” incidents, then 
the frequency of “minor” and “major” incidents should also decrease. In stronger terms, 
it has also been suggested that the three type of incident occur with a fixed relative 
frequency. If this were the case, then observing the effects of a given remedial action 
on “no-harm” errors would allow one to estimate the overall reduction in minor and 
major incidents; clearly useful since the infrequency of the latter means that large scale 
data collection would be required before direct evaluation of new safety procedures 
could be carried out. However, merely being useful does not make a proposition the 
case. Here we examine whether the extent to which the notions of the Heinrich triangle 
are reasonable and the potential pitfalls of putting too much faith in the concept. 
 
The discussion is based on the use of deductive reasoning and involves adopting the 
role of devil’s advocate, constructing exemplar vignettes, based on mathematical 
insight, to illustrate potential problems that might arise if too much faith is put in the 
Heinrich triangle notions.  
 
3.2 The rationale behind using the devil’s advocate role to provide constructive 
criticism  
The use of mathematical modelling is relatively uncommon in relation to health services 
research and some of the techniques used may be somewhat alien to those concerned 
with patient safety. This is particularly the case in relation to the present discussion, 
since it is based on little more than thought experiments. There has not been the 
opportunity to collect data to confirm or deny whether the examples constructed are 
typical or atypical. 
 
There are those who may feel uneasy with the notion of study methods that are devoid 
of any data. In view of this, it is perhaps worth promoting the use of exemplar vignettes 
for identifying potential system problems. The method is basically concerned with 
constructing counterexamples, a technique that is used frequently in mathematics and 
logic, rather more than in other scientific disciplines (although experiments that didn’t 
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rationale behind the search for counterexamples is based on the notion that it can often 
be as valuable to know what is not universally true as to know what is. Furthermore, 
falsehood can be established far more easily than truth.  
 
3.3 The use of vignettes 
The examples given have come about as a result of considering some of the logical 
consequences of the notions surrounding the Heinrich triangle. This has been very 
much influenced by the presence in the project team of a mathematician.  This leads to 
a presentational difficulty since the undue use of technical mathematical terminology 
would not help to clarify issues for a general healthcare audience. Instead, we have 
adopted a format whereby mathematical details are for the most part well hidden and 
their consequences are illustrated by describing a number of hypothetical yet credible 
vignettes. These give pen portraits of sets of circumstances in which credence in the 
Heinrich triangle could lead to illogical or unfounded inference or unexpected and 
perhaps counterintuitive analysis results. The use of the term “Cautionary Tales” has 
been used to describe this collection of vignettes since hopefully most have a “moral” in 
that they indicate a lesson that may be learnt.  
 
3.4 Vignettes related to the use of Heinrich’s triangle 
It should be said that the initial reaction of the mathematical member of the research 
team (SG) to the notion of a fixed relative frequency of different forms of safety incident 
was extremely sceptical. From a systems viewpoint, safety incidents often occur as the 
result of complex interactions and the chance concatenation of different events and 
circumstances. To a mathematician, the notion that there is a fixed homeostatic 
mechanism at work that maintains the same relative frequency of different categories 
of incident seems bizarre.    
 
In view of this, several vignettes have been constructed to illustrate circumstances 
where such behaviour would not be expected or, even if it were, this would not help the 
monitoring process. However, in the interests of equity, it is perhaps worth starting with 
a vignette where the homeostatic principles of Heinrich triangle might be expected to 
occur. 
 
 
  253.4.1 Vignette 1 - a system exhibiting homeostasis 
A wayward G.P. habitually forgets to check whether his patients have a penicillin 
allergy before prescribing it. Each time this is done is certainly an error event. However, 
for most patients no harm is suffered since they are not in fact allergic. But some 
patients have a mild allergy and undergo a mild reaction; and some unfortunate 
patients suffer a major reaction.  
 
Concerned colleagues convince him to change his ways, so that instead of forgetting to 
check allergy status on 80% of occasions, the negligence rate is reduced to 40%. As a 
result, the frequency of both mild and major reactions is halved.    
 
Moral 
 
There are circumstances where homeostasis in the relative 
frequency of different categories of outcome is to be expected. 
 
  
3.4.2 Vignette 2 – a system with no homeostasis 
A version of Russian roulette is played with a revolver that has six chambers. One is 
loaded with a live cartridge, two are loaded with blank cartridges and the other three 
are left empty. The chambers are spun several times, the player places the gun against 
his head and pulls the trigger. 
 
Analysis of outcomes from this dangerous game shows a remarkably consistent 
pattern. The relative frequencies of deaths, minor injuries (powder burns) and no 
injuries were in the ratio 1:2:3. 
 
In an effort to make the game safer, Heinrich’s principle was followed and attention was 
cast on the minor injuries to see if remedial action could be taken. A new loading 
pattern was adopted with one live cartridge, one blank and four chambers left empty. 
This was tremendously successful and halved the proportion of powder burn injuries.  
However, there was no effect on the proportion of deaths, in contravention of Heinrich’s 
concept.  
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Moral 
 
The existence of a fixed ratio between the relative frequency of different 
events does not necessarily mean that this ratio will be preserved if the 
system is altered to change the absolute frequency of a subset of the 
events. 
 
3.4.3 Vignette 3 – a system exhibiting risk migration whereby it is effective to 
promote minor outcomes. 
A new version of Russian roulette was developed. Here a box of live cartridges and two 
boxes of blank cartridges are thoroughly mixed in a sack. Then the revolver is loaded 
with three cartridges drawn at random. The player then places the revolver against his 
head and pulls the trigger. 
 
Again analysis of outcomes shows a remarkably consistent pattern and the long term 
outcomes of deaths, minor injuries and no injuries are in the ratio 1:2:3. 
 
The game evolves and it is decided to mix one box of live cartridges with 5 boxes of 
blank cartridges before choosing three at random from the mix to load into the revolver. 
The effect of this was to increase the proportion of powder burn injuries, but it was also 
found that the proportion of deaths halved.  
 
 
Moral 
 
There may be circumstances whereby promoting the occurrence of 
minor adverse events can reduce the frequency of major adverse 
events. 
 
3.4.4 Vignette 4 – a statistical problem associated with extrapolation  
Suppose a study has been carried out of accidents within a hospital that occurred when 
transferring patients from one ward to another whereby a patient falls from a trolley. 
Suppose the study found that such accidents are relatively rare and that the proportion 
of injury accidents that result in death is 8.3% (these are fictitious data broadly 
comparable to proportion of serious road traffic injuries that result in death). 
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Figure 4: Upper and lower 95% confidence intervals for estimate of proportion of 
serious injury accidents that result in death, given that what is observed 
corresponds to a rate of 8.3%. 
 
Figure 4 shows how broad the confidence intervals are for the underlying death rate 
dependent on the number of cases observed, given that the proportion of deaths 
observed is 8.3%. Small amounts of data on harm are extremely ineffectual in 
indicating the true proportion. For example, ten cases may indicate a death rate 
anywhere between 1% and 26%. Falls from trolleys during transit are presumably very 
rare so an inordinate number of observations would be required even to accumulate 
outcome data on, say 100 such accidents. Even with such a sample size, the upper 
estimation limit in this example is roughly twice the size of the death rate estimated. 
Extrapolation from a single study with such wide margins of error is clearly problematic. 
So, for example, estimating the number of deaths that would be avoided by introducing 
a national programme aimed at reducing trolley accidents would give very imprecise 
estimates that are possibly not meaningful.  
 
 
Moral 
 
In cases where the type of accident being studied is rare and where the 
adverse outcome rate is small, confidence intervals for what that rate is 
are so broad as to make extrapolation very imprecise. It is hard to test 
statistically whether an intervention truly has an effect. 
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3.4.5 Vignette 5 – the central role of rules for categorising events  
Some outcomes do not neatly fit into three categories. Consider the example of birth 
weight of singleton babies, which over the population as a whole is approximately 
normally distributed, having the well known bell shaped distribution as shown in Figure 
5. The question arises how a continuous measure such as birth weight can be used to 
categorise babies as “normal”, “underweight” or “grossly underweight”. 
 
 
Figure 5: A normal distribution fitted to the birth weight of babies resulting from 
singleton pregnancies. 
 
An apparently reasonable procedure is to use two category boundary values  v1 and v2  
to determine the assignment; thus a baby weighing more than v2 would be categorised 
as ‘normal’, one weighing between v1  and v2 would be categorised as “underweight” 
and one below v1  as “grossly underweight”. 
 
In the context of the Heinrich concept, it is natural to examine what relative ratios one 
would expect for given values of v1 and v2 assuming an underlying normal distribution. 
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Figure 6: Illustrating the use of category boundaries v1 and v2 to determine 
which babies are deemed ‘normal’, ‘underweight’ or ‘grossly underweight’ 
 
Omitting the mathematics, the relative ratios correspond to the areas under the curve in 
the three regions A, B and C of the normal distribution shown in Figure . It is common 
practice in medical research to choose category boundaries using normal distributions 
in this way. Thus v2 may be chosen so that region C has an area 95% of the whole 
while v1 is chosen so that region A has an area 1% of the whole. Thus the Heinrich 
ratio would be 95:4:1.  
 
Yet the actual values of v1 and v2 are arbitrary and could just as well to be chosen to 
divide the population of neonates into three other categories and indeed it is also 
common to use a 90% cut-off rather than 95% to correspond to “abnormality”, which 
would give a different Heinrich ratio, for example 90:7:3 or 90:6:4 would both have 
some rationale. 
 
A pure mathematician musing on this turned the question on its head and posed the 
following problem: Given the freedom to choose v1 and v2, what Heinrich ratios can be 
achieved? 
 
Perhaps surprising to non-mathematicians, the answer is that any relative ratio can be 
achieved, so long as the three components of the ratio are positive numbers (however 
small). Further, this does not depend on the underlying probability distribution being 
  30normal. It is sufficient that the probability distribution is continuous and that the set of 
values for which the probability is non-zero is contiguous. For completeness, a formal 
mathematical proof of this is given in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Moral 
 
In cases where there is no natural three way categorisation of events as 
major, minor and no-harm, then the way chosen to categorise events 
can have a major impact on the resulting Heinrich ratio and in principle 
any ratio can result. 
 
Here we would like to draw the attention of the reader to our extensive review of 
medication error literature (Appendix 3). We comment in detail the many 
methodological limitations of medication error research including the lack of agreement 
concerning how to define basic terms such as medication error and the lack of valid 
and reliable methods to assess (potential) patient outcome of medication errors. This 
review shows that there is certainly no natural three way categorisation for medication 
errors.  
 
3.5 Summary 
In this Chapter we have shown that  
1.  A Heinrich ratio may occur in certain circumstances, so that a simple 
intervention may lead to a proportionate reduction in errors of all categories of 
harm. 
2.  Even if there is a Heinrich ratio, some interventions may just affect two 
categories, rather than all three proportionately 
3.  If harmful incidents are rare events, estimations of the rate of harmful events 
from data are very imprecise. 
4.  The Heinrich ratio will be extremely sensitive to the definitions used to 
categorise the data 
 
In the next Chapter we describe a method of visually displaying the Heinrich ratio.
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4  A graphical method for displaying safety data classified into 
three categories 
4.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, a graphical method for displaying safety data is described. From a 
statistical viewpoint, the methods are not new and are based on the use of what are 
known as barycentric coordinates. The use of such methods in relation to safety 
research seems novel. Furthermore, confidence regions will be constructed to allow 
statistical comparisons of different ratios. We require this method to be able to 
investigate the Heinrich ratio using empirical data.  
 
The method is illustrated using data from a study concerning outcomes from 
emergency department visits in the United States,
21 this having the advantage of being 
medical data with fairly clear definitions. 
 
4.2 Developing a visual representation of the Heinrich ratio 
 
Suppose that a given study reports  x  no harm incident,  y  minor incidents and  z  
major incidents, then the Heinrich ratio is  . : :
z y x
z
z y x
y
z y x
x
+ + + + + +
 
 
It would be convenient to compare different studies using a scatter plot, but on the face 
of it this seems complicated since the scatter plot involves three coordinates and thus 
the scatter is in three dimensional space, which in general is difficult to visualise. 
 
However, given that x, y and z are always non-negative, and the relative ratios always 
sum to 1, then the point with coordinates  ) , , (
z y x
z
z y x
y
z y x
x
+ + + + + +
 always lies 
somewhere in the triangle bounded by vertices where the plane with equation x+y+z = 
1 meets the x, y and z axes. This is an equilateral triangle  T  as shown in Figure . 
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Figure 7: Displaying three relative frequencies as a point within an equilateral 
triangle T in three dimensional space. 
 
In visualising Figure , it might help to imagine a room, the x and y axes being the lines 
corresponding to where the floor meets two walls, and the z axis being the line where 
the two walls meet. The equilateral triangle T can then be thought of as a triangular 
glass plate manoeuvred so that it rests against both walls. 
 
Thus, for a given study, it is possible to plot a point in the triangle T that represents the 
three relative ratios. In addition, it is technically feasible to plot an approximately 
elliptical region around the point representing the 95% confidence region, (generalising 
the notion of the 95% confidence interval). Technically, this is rather challenging, 
however the region can be approximated by a hexagon which is computationally rather 
easier to plot.  
 
A certain amount of mathematics is needed in order to convert this three-dimensional 
picture into terms that can be plotted onto paper (or a two-dimensional computer 
screen). Details of this are given in Appendix 2 which also discusses the construction 
of the confidence intervals.  
 
 
  334.3 Illustration of the method in the case of A&E outcomes 
It is useful to illustrate the notion of a triangle plot, although for this purpose we have 
chosen not to use safety data here, but use data from a study of accident and 
emergency visits from the US 
21 (we already referred to this study in section 0). Table 6 
shows the data. These data are summarised graphically by the triangle plot shown in 
Figure . Data from medication error research will be analysed with this method in 
Chapter 5. 
 
 Death  Hospitalisation  Emergency 
department visit 
Self inflicted gunshot wound  1721  191  198 
Assault related gunshot wound  1002  1090  1609 
Self inflicted poisoning  508  8540  9847 
Assault related struck  24  2076  52111 
Assault related cut/pierced  193  977  5292 
Self inflicted cut/pierced  29  427  2203 
Table 6: Classification of the outcome of patients visiting the emergency 
departments. Data taken from Wadman et al. 
21 
 
 
 
Figure 8: A triangle plot of outcome data from emergency departments 
subdivided according to the nature of the admission. (The category 'mild' refers 
to emergency department visits and 'severe' refers to hospitalisation). 
 
At a glance, this figure shows the considerable variation that exists in outcome 
according to the type of case involved. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a much higher relative 
  34proportion of cases of gunshot wounds, particularly those self-inflicted, result in death 
than the relative proportion of deaths resulting from self inflicted poisoning, although 
roughly half these cases result in hospitalisation.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
This graphical method for displaying data is not new and relies on the use of what are 
technically known as “barycentric coordinates”. However, the use of this method in 
relation to safety data appears to be novel. 
 
Such triangle plots give a succinct and immediately comprehensible method for 
interpreting complex data classified into three categories. Furthermore, the method 
constructing confidence regions can be used for identifying if ratios are statistically 
different. In the next Chapter we use this approach to compare data from the literature 
and establish whether there is a unique Heinrich ratio for medication errors, or whether 
different studies produce significantly different results. 
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5  An analysis of medication error data using the new graphical 
method 
 
5.1 Background 
In Chapter 4 we presented a new graphical method for displaying safety data classified 
in three categories of (potential) harm. In this Chapter we use this method to display 
data from medication error studies to explore whether there is a Heinrich ratio for 
medication errors. 
 
5.2 Data sources 
We undertook a literature search to identify eligible studies.  
 
Inclusion criteria:  
Original studies which reported results of the incidence of medication errors in the 
hospital setting by actual or potential outcome in at least three categories. Studies had 
to provide sufficient detail of their methodology including data collection methods and 
data analysis to judge the quality of the study. In particular studies had to report the 
definition of the medication error, the exact method of data collection, a description of 
how the medication error rate was calculated, and a description of how the severity of 
the medication errors were determined. 
 
Exclusion criteria: 
Studies were excluded if the results of the study were not reported according to 
severity equivalent to Heinrich's three categories (or if the results could not be 
recategorised). Data were categorised in the following three categories: 
1. MINOR: harmless/minor/no injury errors  
2. MODERATE: errors with moderate severity  
3. SEVERE: serious/severe/fatal errors 
 
Studies were also excluded if their results were based on spontaneous error reporting 
systems as, because of known underreporting, and because there is an unknown bias 
in spontaneous error reporting, i.e. it is unknown whether severe errors are reported to 
the same extent as no harm errors (see also Appendix 3 for a more detailed discussion 
of the different data collection methods) 
 
Eleven studies were included. Details of these studies are summarised in (Table 7). 
Reference   Minor  Moderate  Severe Country, clinical 
area 
Data collection methods  Assessment method for severity of errors 
Adverse drug events and medication errors (all types) 
Bates et al., 1995 
28   525  4  1  USA 
general medicine 
and intensive care 
self reports, review of 
medical charts and 
medication orders 
consensus of two physicians 
Kaushal et al., 2001 
29  
611  5  0  USA, paediatrics  self reports, review of 
medical charts and 
medication orders 
consensus of two physicians 
Prescribing errors  
Dean et al., 2002 
30 160  224  142  UK,  teaching 
hospital 
review of medication 
orders 
consensus of pharmacist and physician 
Dean et al., 2002 
(unpublished data)  
160 289  123  UK,  teaching 
hospital 
review of medication 
orders 
consensus of pharmacist and physician 
Lesar, 1997 
31  537  96  43    review of medication 
orders 
one or more health professionals 
Administration errors 
Dean and Barber, 
2000 
32 
199 58  0  UK 
general medicine, 
surgical ward 
observation of drug 
administration 
mean score of four health professionals 
(pharmacist, physician, nurse) 
33 
Taxis and Barber, 
2004 
34 
22 39  4  Germany,  surgical 
ward, intensive 
care 
observation of drug 
administration 
mean score of one pharmacist, one 
nurse, one physician 
35 
Taxis and Barber, 
2003 
25 
102 144  3  UK,  different 
specialities 
observation of drug 
administration 
mean of four health professionals 
(pharmacist, physician, nurse) 
33 
van den Bemt et al., 
2002 
36 
81 50  0  Netherlands, 
intensive care 
observation of drug 
administration 
consensus of two pharmacists 
Hartley and Dhillon, 
1998 
37 
198 44  12  UK,  general 
medicine, surgical 
wards 
observation of drug 
administration 
consensus of three pharmacists 
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Tissot et al., 1999 
38 51  55  26  France,  intensive 
care 
observation of drug 
administration 
classified by one physician 
Table 7: The incidence of different types of medication errors reported from 12 studies  
 
 5.3 Graphical comparison of studies 
A triangle plot of the data summarised in Table 7 is shown in Figure. 
 
 
Figure 9: A triangle plot illustrating the relative frequency of different forms of 
medication error based on data from Table 7
 
This plot exhibits considerable scatter, lending little support for the Heinrich triangle 
concept that there should be a relatively fixed relationship between the relative 
frequencies of mild, moderate and severe medication errors. Although there is a 
“grand total” figure, which reflects the relative frequencies of all the data combined 
(shown by the square symbol), this clearly does not reflect the overall data which 
have a high degree of inherent variability. This is a central issue in this report, and so 
we now compare this total with each individual study, showing the 95% confidence 
regions.  
 
In each case the confidence regions do not remotely overlap – lending support to the 
view that there is a systematic and statistically significant disparity between the 
‘grand total’ relative ratio and each of the constituent data sets.  
 
In the section describing triangle plots, it was shown that these 95% confidence 
regions are elliptical and can be closely approximated by a hexagon, which is 
computationally more convenient to display (Appendix 2). When such a confidence 
region is displayed for the “grand total” shown above in Figure, the overall sample 
size is sufficiently large that the confidence region is very small, comparable in size 
  39to the symbol used to display the single data point. This is convenient since in the 
following series of triangle charts, only one confidence region needs to be displayed 
– that for the data from the study being examined. In some other cases, such as the 
ones displayed in Figure  and Figure , the 95% confidence regions from the individual 
studies are also so small they can not be distinguished from the point.  
  
 
Figure 10: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data 
taken from Bates et al., 1995 
28 (study on adverse drug events and all types of 
medication errors) (point is almost inseparable from the left vertex) 
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Figure 11: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data 
taken from Kaushal et al., 2001 
29 (study on adverse drug events and all types 
of medication errors) (point is almost inseparable from the left vertex) 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data 
taken from Dean et al., 2002 
30 (study on prescribing errors) 
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Figure 13: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data 
taken from Dean et al., 2002 (unpublished data) (study on prescribing errors) 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data 
taken from Lesar, 1997 
31 (study on prescribing errors) 
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Figure 15: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data 
taken from Dean and Barber, 2000 
32 (study on administration errors) 
 
 
 
Figure 16:Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data taken 
from Taxis and Barber, 2004 
34 (study on administration errors of intravenous 
medication) 
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Figure 17: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data 
taken from Taxis and Barber, 2003 
25 (study on administration errors of 
intravenous medication) 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data 
taken from van der Bemt et al., 2002 
36 (study on administration errors of all 
routes of administration) 
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Figure 19: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data 
taken from Hartley and Dhillon, 1998 
37 (study on administration errors of 
intravenous medication) 
 
 
Figure 20: Triangle plot comparing the grand total relative ratios with data 
taken from Tissot et al., 1999 
38 (study on administration errors of all routes of 
administration) 
 
5.4 Discussion 
We find considerably variability between studies concerning the relative proportions 
of minor, moderate and severe medication errors, and the “grand total” is 
substantially and significantly different from all the relative proportions of the 
constituent studies. Some of the variability may be explained firstly by systematic 
differences in medication error rates by setting or stage of the process, and secondly 
  45by differences due to variability in data collection and classification methods. We 
discuss both of these issues in more detail below. Nevertheless, our findings do not 
support the notion of a stable Heinrich ratio for medication errors. 
 
Does the Heinrich ratio depend on setting or type of error being studied? 
We included studies from a range of different countries, settings and clinical areas as 
outlined in Table 7. Some of the studies focused on errors occurring in specific 
stages of the medicines use process such as prescribing or administration errors, 
others included preventable adverse drug events related to all steps in the process. 
All of these may systematically influence the medication error rate. For example, it 
has been suggested that paediatric patients have a higher risk of experiencing 
medication errors than adult patients.
39 Similarly, it has been suggested that most 
serious errors result from prescribing errors rather than administration errors.
40 
Therefore we would expect different “Heinrich ratios” in different settings or for 
different stages of the process. However, we do not find an obvious trend of 
clustering of studies which identified errors in similar settings, for example the studies 
carried out in intensive care.
36;38 Similarly, there does not seem to be an obvious 
trend for prescribing error studies or administration error studies, although some of 
the variability may be due to variability between hospitals.  
 
Does the Heinrich ratio depend on study methodology? 
We present a substantial review of medication error research methodology in 
Appendix 3. We show in detail the many methodological limitations including the lack 
of standardisation in:  
- defining medication errors  
- data collection methods  
- methods to analyse the severity/outcome of the medication error 
 
These methodological limitations may partly explain the great variability in Heinrich 
ratios found in this chapter. Different definitions for medication errors were used. For 
example the study by Dean et al. 
30 used a consensus based definition of a 
prescribing error whereas some other studies based their definition on implicit 
judgement of pharmacists.
31 Such differences in definition may mean that some 
studies collect more harmless medication errors in relation to harmful medication 
errors than others. 
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we find both studies which were based on actual outcome (i.e. collecting data on 
preventable adverse drug events) 
28;29 in the left corner of the triangle, i.e. these 
studies found a relatively small proportion of severe and moderate errors in relation 
to minor errors. All other studies were process based studies which collected data on 
medication errors and used different methods to predict their potential outcome. This 
method in general does not take into account the frequency with which such errors 
result in true adverse outcomes and therefore may overestimate the proportion of 
severe and moderate medication errors.  
 
Finally, many different methods are used to determine outcome of medication errors 
and different categories are used to report the results thereof. Furthermore, we had 
to reclassify the errors to fit into major – moderate – minor categories for studies 
using more than three categories. Table 8 shows a few examples of how we 
classified data. For example, for the study by Bates et al. 
28 we decided to classify all 
“potential adverse drug events” as minor events as they did not result in actual harm 
to the patient. Studies such as Tissot et al. 
38 reported their results in four categories, 
so we classified potential fatal and life threatening errors as major errors. We took 
great care in this process to be as consistent as possible across studies. However, 
some variability remains when authors chose different cut off points to distinguish 
between the different levels of harm. For example, the category of minor errors were 
defined as having “no risk for patients and no implications”
37, as “very unlikely to 
have an adverse effect on the patient”
33 or as “potentially significant”.
31 These 
definitions suggest that there may have been slightly different cut off points to 
differentiate between potentially minor and moderate errors. As we have already 
highlighted in Chapter 3 (Vignette 5), the cut off point between the categories greatly 
influences the ratio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  47Classification 
for Heinrich 
ratio 
Bates et al 
28 Lesar 
31 Tissot 
38 
Major  Life threatening preventable 
adverse drug events 
Potential 
fatal/severe 
Potential fatal and 
potential life 
threatening 
Moderate  Serious preventable adverse 
drug events 
Potential 
serious 
Potential significant 
Minor/no-
injury errors 
Life 
threatening/serious/significant 
potential adverse drug events 
(including intercepted events) 
plus medication errors 
Potential 
significant 
Minor 
Table 8: Examples of reclassifications to establish Heinrich ratios for individual 
studies 
 
Is there a Heinrich ratio in a narrow well defined research setting? 
Based on the analysis of the data we find that there is little evidence for a stable 
Heinrich ratio for medication errors. There is some indication that if one research 
group, using the same methods, definitions, studying the same type of medication 
error in the same setting over time might observe a stable Heinrich ratio. This could 
indicate that a fairly safe set of errors was studied, because it involved a low risk 
process (e.g., medication errors associated with oral drug administration in hospital). 
However, finding a stable Heinrich ratio in just a very narrow research setting does 
not provide the robustness required by the NPSA. Nor does a stable Heinrich ratio 
mean that any changes in minor incidents would predict a proportional reduction in 
harm.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
There is considerably variability between studies concerning the relative proportions 
of minor, moderate and severe medication errors. Combining data from all the 
studies available gives a “grand total” that can be used to derive relative proportions. 
However, this grand total figure is not representative; it is substantially and 
significantly different from all the relative proportions derived in each of the 
constituent studies.  
 
In this Chapter we have investigated the Heinrich triangle using data from medication 
error research, finding little support for the concept. This complements our findings 
investigating the logical and mathematical basis of the Heinrich triangle in the 
previous Chapters. At this point, the reader may go straight to the final Chapter 
where we summarise the main conclusions from our report.  
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However, the authors were also interested in investigating the Heinrich triangle using 
empirical data from a different context. As we have highlighted repeatedly, one of the 
limitations in using medication error data for the Heinrich triangle has been the lack of 
standardisation within these data. One of the cautionary tales in Chapter 3 
highlighted the sensitivity of the ratio to the position of the boundaries between 
categories.  Perhaps our failure to establish a stable ratio just reflected different 
definitions and methods?  Therefore we were interested in testing the Heinrich 
triangle using another set of data of “higher quality”. Data from road traffic accidents 
seemed suitable because of the good quality of the data and because outcomes are 
also reported in three distinct categories. The following chapter explores whether we 
find support for the Heinrich triangle in road traffic accident data.  
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6  Road traffic accidents under the microscope 
 
6.1 Illustrating the use of the triangular plot using road accident data 
The data used in this Chapter concern the outcomes of road traffic accidents in Great 
Britain recorded on an annual basis between 1993 and 2003.
41 In the field of road 
traffic safety, meticulous records are kept of every road traffic injury accident that is 
reported to the police. Outcomes are classified as deaths, major injury (requiring 
hospital admission) and minor injury. Great pains are taken to ensure that data are 
complete and a standardised data collection form is used which provides little scope 
for non-uniformity in what is recorded in different centres. In spite of all this effort the 
Department of Transport suggests that there is still some under-reporting, under-
recording and misclassification leading to underestimating the number of seriously 
injured casualties; however, for the purpose of our project these are assumed to be 
constant over time and therefore do not affect the validity of our conclusions.
41 
 
6.2 Overall trends in road traffic accidents in Great Britain between 1993 and 
2003 
The achievements in improving road safety have been remarkable and during the 
period concerned there was a marked decline in both fatalities and serious injuries, in 
spite of increasing car ownership and total travel and variations in the annual total 
numbers of road traffic accidents. These overall trends are shown in Figure 21 and 
Figure . 
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Figure 21: Annual numbers of fatal road traffic accidents for Great Britain 
during the period 1993 - 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Annual numbers of all, of minor injury and serious injury road traffic 
accidents for Great Britain during the period 1993 - 2003 
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6.3Using triangle plots to examine road traffic accident data  
These systematic variations in the overall numbers of different types of accident 
suggested that this topic would be a useful means for investigating Heinrich's 
concept that the relative proportions of the three accident types should be constant. 
Also, road traffic safety is a field for which considerable amounts of data are already 
available, conveniently classified into three severity groupings, with uniformity of the 
criteria used to classify cases, it also gives a useful additional example of the use of 
triangle plots for displaying complex safety data. 
 
The triangle plot shown in Figure  shows the annual relative ratios of the three 
categories of road traffic accident outcomes. On the face of it, there appears to be 
remarkable consistency between the 11 years, so much so, that it is difficult to plot 
the individual points to distinguish one from the others.  
 
Originally, this remarkable stability from one year to the next was taken to indicate 
some degree of homeostasis suggesting that there might indeed be some substance 
to Heinrich's concept. However, there is potentially a “floor” effect at play; since the 
proportion of death accidents is relatively small and cannot fall below zero, thus 
inevitably this might induce bunching. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: A triangular plot of the annual relative frequency of outcomes for 
road traffic accidents in Great Britain between 1993 and 2003. 
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methods illustrated in Figure . 
 
 
Figure 24: Examining the triangle plots of annual relative ratios of road 
accident type in closer detail. 
 
This closer examination reveals that the cluster of points is very much parallel to the 
base of the triangle, indicating that the relative proportion of accidents involving a 
death has remained approximately constant during the 11 year period 1993 to 2003. 
On the other hand there is much more variability concerning the split between minor 
and serious injuries. 
 
Intrigued by the regular nature of the cluster of data points, an even more detailed 
examination of the graphical nature of the data was undertaken, shown in Figure . 
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Figure 25: Triangle plots of annual relative ratios of road accident type labelled 
according to the year of the monitoring period (1993 – 2003). Successive data 
points have been joined by a line (1993=1 to 2003=11)   
 
 
6.4 Road traffic accidents and Heinrich's concept 
In Figure , to aid interpretation, successive data points have been joined by a line, 
although for two clusters (years 2 and 3, and years 8, 9 and 10) the data points are 
so close that they obscure these lines. 
 
The data set is clearly very structured, so much so that the notion of using formal 
statistical methods to establish this is possibly facile. During the course of the period 
1993 to 2003, the proportion of all road accidents that involved a death remained 
approximately constant. At the same time, there was a systematic reduction in the 
relative proportion of accidents that result in serious injury compared to minor 
accidents. This is consistent with much of the activity that underlies the promotion of 
road traffic safety: improved structural safety of vehicles, traffic calming in urban 
areas and drink driving policies. Part of the thinking underlying these measures is 
both to reduce the overall accident rate and, for those accidents that occur, increase 
the chances that the results are minor injuries at most. 
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outcomes conflicts with what would be expected from the Heinrich triangle, that the 
relative proportion of the three categories of accident should be constant. This is 
clearly incompatible with the evidence shown in Figure  which shows that beyond 
reasonable doubt it changes systematically.   
 
As shown in Figure , year on year, there has been marked trend for the total number 
of serious injury accidents to decrease. Under the terms of Heinrich's concept, this 
should be reflected by a year on year reduction in the annual numbers of all 
accidents and minor injury accidents, again this has clearly not been the case, as 
shown in Figure .  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this Chapter we complemented our work on the Heinrich triangle by analysing data 
from a non medication error context in which there were precise definitions of 
categories. Data of road traffic accidents met these criteria.  Using our data display 
method we can identify interesting trends, however, these do not produce a stable 
Heinrich ratio. What is seen instead is an illustration of one of the cautionary tales 
from Chapter 3 (vignette 3) in which an intervention alters the ratio of minor and 
moderate effects, but does not affect the number of serious events 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
 
7.1 Answering the research questions 
The origin of this project was a request to agree a method of measuring the severity 
of outcome from medication errors, so that a Heinrich ratio could be calculated. This 
would allow the estimation of harm resulting from medication errors, and allow the 
evaluation of initiatives to reduce medication errors. We formalised this in a number 
of questions which we repeat below, together with the answers found in this report.    
 
1. Is there a Heinrich triangle (ie stable ratio) relating major and minor harm to 
medication errors? 
Response -  there is no Heinrich ratio for harm resulting from medication errors. It 
may be theoretically possible in a very narrow scenario as discussed in 
Chapter 5, however, there is no evidence for this. 
Refutation: 
1.  Reviewing the literature on the Heinrich ratio raises serious doubts about the 
validity and generalisability of the original concept (Chapter 2) 
2.  Logic: the thought experiments in Chapter 3 show that other situations can 
occur 
3. Mathematics:   
a.  the boundaries are extremely sensitive to changes in definitions so 
that any ratio could be achieved 
b.  Appendix 3 shows that definitions of medication errors and the 
ensuing harm are widely different. 
4. Empirical  evidence 
a.  variability in the ratios for admissions to accident and emergency 
departments illustrate this for non-drug related data in a medical 
context (Chapter 4) 
b.  reconstruction of Heinrich ratios from published papers on medication 
errors shows significantly different ratios (Chapter 5) 
c.  systematic changes in ratios over time in data from road traffic 
accidents show that the Heinrich ratio is not stable in this setting 
(Chapter 6) 
2. What are the values in the ratio (errors that do not cause harm : minor harm : 
major harm)? 
Response – now not relevant as question 1 above has been refuted 
  563. Is any change linearly proportional? For example, if the number of errors overall is 
reduced by 20%, will minor harm and major harm also be reduced by 20%? 
Response – not relevant if the ratio is extremely unlikely to exist. Even if it did exist 
the road traffic accident data suggests that non-linear shifts could occur 
(Chapter 5). 
4. How could we represent this graphically to illustrate and communicate change? 
Response – a novel graphical illustration has been created (Chapter 4) 
5. How could we show that any change was statistically significant, and not the result 
of chance? For example, is 247:28:1 significantly different to 312:25:1? 
Response – development of 95% confidence regions for the graphical method 
(Chapter 4) 
 
It is very difficult to show that something does not exist, which is why we have had to 
use a range of methods and data sets. However, in studying the properties of the 
Heinrich ratio we conclude that the ratio seems very unlikely to apply to medication 
errors, and that, even if it did, it seems unlikely to be usable as a method to show that 
reductions in the number of all errors lead to a proportionate reduction in the number 
of patients harmed. 
 
This finding is in accord with our experience. We have studied many thousands of 
medication related acts and errors, and feel that the Heinrich ratio is counter-intuitive. 
Surely some errors are inherently more dangerous than others; more likely to lead to 
harm? A single overdose of a vitamin tablet would be much less likely to cause harm 
than an overdose of an opiate or cytotoxic agent. Errors in drug administration by the 
intravenous route are more likely to lead to harm than errors in oral or topical 
administration. Hence initiatives that focus on the types of errors more likely to lead 
to harm would be expected to produce a greater contribution to safety than reduction 
in errors that have little potential for harm.  
 
7.2 A way forward 
Our findings leave us with the following questions: 
 
First, from our literature review in Appendix 3 it is clear that it is hard to build 
knowledge and transferable lessons from the literature because of the different 
lessons and literatures used. In relatively new research areas knowledge is often 
built from a patchwork of small studies, however this can not be achieved if they are 
too different. There is a need for better standardisation. 
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Second, is the causation of medical errors a linear process from which predictions 
can be made, or is it a system that should be defined “complex” or “chaotic”? 
 
If it is a linear process, can there be a way in which we can predict harm from 
measurable incidents? For example, is there a way in which one can estimate 
whether there will be a reduction in harm following initiatives to reduce the incidence 
of medication errors? 
 
In other words, can the original aim of the project be achieved by other means? 
 
We think this could be achieved by the building of a risk model for medication errors. 
One of us (SG) has constructed a risk model for error in cardiac surgery which allows 
the monitoring of individual surgeons to identify whether their surgical outcomes are 
in the expected range. The building of a model like this in the field of medication 
errors would be a substantial piece of work. However, we can indicate the sort of 
issues which we would expect to be in the model. Our experience, the literature on 
medication errors and the literature on the causes of errors in general would lead us 
to suggest the following factors: 
1. Therapeutic index of the drug. This is the relationship between the 
minimum concentration of drug required for the drug to have a clinical effect, 
and the maximum concentration above which toxic effects appear.  
2. Toxicity of the drug. 
3. Reversibility of error. If an error is detected, how possible is it to reverse, 
avoid or ameliorate its harmful effects? 
4. The necessity of the drug. This is the extent to which the correct dose of 
the drug is needed to prevent harm. 
5. The duration of exposure to error. 
6. The resilience of the patient. The extent to which their body is able to cope 
with an error. Are they relatively healthy when an error occurs, or near death? 
7. The resilience of the systems of work applicable to medicines.  The extent 
to which there are checks and controls to avoid or trap errors and stop them 
reaching the patient. 
8. Whether the error leads to an increased exposure to a drug, or decreased 
exposure (or both, as in the case of giving the wrong drug).  
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the elements could be represented. While much work exists on the prevalence of 
medication errors and some work on their severity, there is relatively little work on 
harm and the factors that cause harm. Most evidence of harm comes from incident 
reports, and commonly refers to the drug and route of administration. However, many 
factors are not reported and hence it is hard to build a model from this information. 
As we note in our report on evaluation of electronic prescribing, this issue is crucial 
for the development of any economic modeling of the consequences of error, and of 
any interventions to reduce it. 
 
7.3 Research recommendations 
We have the following research recommendations:  
 
1. The relationship between errors and harm needs to be further investigated. We 
have suggested a model built from a combination of the literature, knowledge of 
pharmacology, logic and understanding of errors in industry. Work is needed to 
investigate whether our suggested components are suitable predictors of harm from 
medication errors and whether additional factors are needed. Furthermore, the 
strength of each individual factor needs to be determined.  
 
2. Our extensive literature review presented in Appendix 3 has shown the many 
methodological limitations of medication error research. There is an urgent need for a 
common taxonomy in patient safety research for defining, classifying, measuring and 
reporting medication incidents. We suggest this is developed as a consensus 
statement, similar to the CONSORT statement that is widely used for clinical trials. 
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  70Appendix 1: Mathematical proof accompanying section 0
 
Let f denote a continuous probability distribution function whose non-zero values 
occur within the interval [u,w], which might be an unbounded interval. Then the 
following is easy to establish: 
 
Theorem  
 
If A, B and C are positive real numbers that sum to 1, then there exist category 
boundary values v1 and v2 such that 
 
∫ =
1
) (
v
u
A dz z f  
 
   
∫ =
2
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v
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B dz z f  
 
and 
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w
v
C dz z f
2
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Proof 
 
Consider the cumulative distribution function g(x) defined on the interval [u,w]  given 
by 
∫ =
x
u
dz z f x g ) ( ) (  
Clearly g(u)=0 and, since f  is a probability distribution, g(w)=1. 
 
Also, within the interval [u,w], g is differentiable with 
 
  . 0 ) ( ) ( > = x f x
dx
dg
 
 
Thus the function g is continuous and strictly increasing. 
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In view of this, the value v1  corresponds to the (unique) value of x where g(x)=A and  
v2 corresponds to the (unique) value of x where g(x)= 1-A-B. 
This result implies that under very general terms, if outcomes are continuous, and 
subdivided into three categories by arbitrary boundary values, then it is possible to 
achieve any Heinrich ratio, depending how these boundary values are chosen.  
  72Appendix 2: Mathematical details accompanying chapter 4 
 
Mathematical details concerning derivation of coordinates for plotting data 
points within an equilateral triangle and constructing approximate confidence 
regions around those data points (accompanying Chapter 4) 
 
Derivation of coordinates for the data points 
It should be noted that the vector representing a data point in T is the weighted 
vector sum of the three vectors corresponding to the three vertices of the triangle, the 
weights simply being the three relative proportions. In order to visualise a data point 
in two dimensional space, one simply needs to take the corresponding weighted 
vector sum of the vectors representing the vertices of an equilateral triangle. Any 
equilateral triangle serves this purpose, however it is useful to use the triangle with 
vertices:  ), 1 , 0 ( 1 = v )
2
1
,
2
3
( 2 − − = v  and  ).
2
1
,
2
3
( 3 − = v  
 
Thus if a given study reports  x  no harm incidents,  y  minor incidents and  z  major 
incidents, then these data are represented by the point: 
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which can be expressed as the two dimensional vector 
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This is shown in Figure 26 
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Figure 26: Representing three relative frequencies as a point within an 
equilateral triangle in two dimensional space. 
 
It should be noticed in passing that if x=y=z, then the data point is represented as the 
centroid of the triangle, as one would expect.  
 
 
Approximate confidence regions 
The graphical technique discussed above can be enhanced by superimposing a 
region around the data point corresponding to a 95% confidence interval. Precise 
estimation of the boundary of such a region using exact statistical methods is 
somewhat complex. Alternatively, an approximate confidence region can be 
constructed as follows: 
 
Standard statistical methods
 exist for calculating 95% confidence intervals for the 
estimate of a proportion of events that fall into one of two categories. For example, if 
sample sizes are not too small and if the estimated proportions are not close to either 
zero or one, then an approximate  95% confidence interval is given by: 
 
N
p p
p
) 1 (
96 . 1
−
±  
 
Where N is the number of observations and p is the estimated proportion  
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If sample sizes are small, or if the proportion estimates are close to zero or one, then 
exact statistical methods 
42 can be used to get precise estimates for the confidence 
intervals, although these are more difficult to express in terms of mathematical 
formulae.  
 
Using these estimation methods, one can calculate a confidence interval for the 
relative proportions of major and minor incidents. Equally, one can derive a 
confidence interval for the relative proportions of minor and no-harm incidents and 
can repeat this process for major and no-harm incidents.  
 
Having done this, the geometric method shown in Figure 27 illustrates how these 
three confidence intervals can be used to derive a polygonal confidence region 
around the data point used to represent a survey’s findings. 
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Figure 27: Using confidence intervals for relative proportions considered two 
at a time to infer a confidence region for the relative proportions of three 
quantities. 
 
 
Confidence interval contours 
The polygonal region used in the previous section has a subtle statistical deficiency 
in that it is based on considering sets of events in pairs rather than using all the data 
simultaneously, whereas in principle, one should construct a confidence region using 
a joint multinomial distribution based on all of the data. For large sample sizes, this 
can be achieved using maximum likelihood methods.  
 
There is only a slight difference between the polygonal approximation and the 
maximum likelihood estimated contour as illustrated below (Figure 28). 
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Figure 28: Comparison of 95% contour region derived from multinomial 
distribution and polygonal approximation (data in ratio 50:50:200) 
 
  77Appendix 3: A commentary on medication error definitions, 
research methods and severity assessment 
 
1. Background 
In this project we investigated whether there is a Heinrich triangle for medication 
errors. The basis of the Heinrich triangle is to classify events in three categories of 
outcome (no harm accidents/moderate injuries /major injuries). However, many 
studies of errors have not assessed severity, but have instead counted all errors 
equally. Others have attempted to assess severity in a variety of ways based on 
actual outcome, expert judgement of potential outcome or on proxy indicators of 
severity. This leads to the more fundamental question of which events should be 
classified as medication errors (i.e., what is the definition of a medication error) and 
what is the difference between a medication error and an adverse drug event, an 
adverse drug reaction, a near miss incident, to name but a few of the terms that are 
used to describe medication incidents. 
 
These issues of definitions are closely related to the methods that are used to obtain 
data on medication errors. The results of medication error research are very sensitive 
to changes in definitions, methods, and assessment of ensuing harm. These 
differences can lead to reports of medication error rates that are orders of magnitude 
apart and make it very difficult to compare different studies. For any result of a study 
to be used to establish a Heinrich ratio we need to consider the mentioned issues.  
 
Complementary to the main body of this report we therefore attempt to make sense 
of the diverse literature on medication errors. We investigate the following three 
issues: 
•  definitions of medication errors, and how these are related to other terms 
used in the area (adverse drug reactions, adverse drug event, adverse event 
etc). 
•  methods used to measure medication error rates, highlighting their strengths 
and limitations  
•  methods used to assess the (potential) outcome of medication errors, 
highlighting their strengths and limitations 
 
However, this section is not only to be seen in the context of investigating the 
Heinrich ratio of medication errors;  we think the results presented in this section 
have wider implications. In the area of medication error research, we find a general 
  78lack of standard definitions and methods. Even more problematic is the poor 
standard of reporting definitions and methods in research studies. This makes it 
difficult sometimes impossible to assess the generalisability of research. There is an 
urgent need to establish standards for conducting and reporting medication error 
research. Such standards have been successfully developed for clinical trials of 
drugs (the “CONSORT statement”) 
43 and it is high time for similar action in research 
of patient safety incidents involving drug use. The following review is therefore also a 
basis for the development of such standards.  
 
2. Data sources 
A literature search in Pubmed, International Pharmaceutical Abstracts, EMBASE and 
our own database of literature was carried out in February/March 2004 with an 
update in June 2005. This was complemented by a hand search in relevant libraries 
for early material on adverse drug reactions (for example, in the library of the Royal 
Society of Medicine). Furthermore, the cited references of relevant articles were 
carefully studied to identify further references. Search terms included medication 
errors, adverse drug reaction, adverse drug event. 
 
3. Definitions of medication incident 
3.1 Terms used to describe medication incidents and the schools of thought 
using them 
Terms that are most commonly used to describe incidents that involve medication 
use are:  
• medication  errors 
•  patient safety incident involving medicines 
•  adverse drug reactions  
•  adverse drug events 
• adverse  events 
•  inappropriate prescribing/drug related problems 
Furthermore, non-compliance of patients could be also considered a medical or 
medication error,
44 but this is outside the scope of the present report.  
 
A shift in terminology can be observed in recent years to avoid the word “error” and 
use “safety” instead. For example the terms, “patient safety research” or “patient 
safety incidents” are used frequently. Consequently, the NPSA uses the term “patient 
  79safety incident involving drug use” as a synonym for medication errors, although 
safety and error are two different concepts. 
 
Broadly the events fall into two categories: 
•  deviations from defined/established processes of drug use regardless of their 
outcome (medication errors, patient safety incidents involving drug use) 
•  harmful events and the role of medicines in their cause (adverse drug 
reactions, adverse drug events, adverse events). 
 
In order to understand difference and overlap of definitions, it may be helpful to look 
at the disciplines or schools of thought from which these terms are derived (Table 9) 
 
Discipline/school of 
thought 
Aims Terms 
Pharmacovigilance / 
Pharmacoepidemiology 
Pre- and postmarketing 
surveillance of drugs to 
establish risk profile for each 
drug 
Adverse drug reactions 
Medication error research; 
Health and safety; 
Systems process 
management; 
Psychology of behaviour 
Analysis of the incidence and 
causes of medication errors 
Medication errors, 
patient safety incidents 
involving drug use, 
adverse drug event, 
near miss 
Clinical trials  Assessment of 
efficiency/effectiveness/safety 
of individual drugs 
Adverse events 
Quality 
assurance/management 
Quality improvement  Inappropriate 
prescribing/drug related 
problems 
Table 9: Overview of the terms used by the different disciplines/schools of 
thought investigating medication incidents 
 
The disciplines pharmacovigilance and pharmacoepidemiology are traditionally 
concerned with studying adverse drug reactions with the aim of describing the 
individual risk profile of each drug. Adverse drug reactions are thus the 
characteristics of a drug and can be largely explained by its pharmacological 
properties and the interactions between drug and human body. Much of the research 
and in particular the regulation in the area of pharmacovigilance was triggered by the 
discovery of the foetal malformation due to thalidomide. Methods to obtain 
information on adverse drug reactions include clinical trials and spontaneous adverse 
drug reaction reporting systems (such as the Yellow Card Scheme in the UK). The 
term adverse event is used in the context of clinical trials.  
  80 
The medication error research community is concerned with assessing the risks of 
drug use in practice, studying the processes including prescribing, dispensing, 
preparing and administration of medicines, and identifying the failures and faults in 
these systems. Terms used include medication errors, adverse drug events, 
inappropriate prescribing. Early research in this area assessed the error rates 
associated with different drug distribution systems.
45 More recently, a lot of research 
efforts are around the incidence and causes of prescribing errors in hospital 
30 and 
the impact of electronic prescribing systems on medication errors and adverse drug 
events.
46 The majority of this research has been carried out in secondary care. Fewer 
studies looked at the situation of medication errors in ambulatory care 
47 or 
investigated dispensing errors in community pharmacies.
48;49 As we have already 
highlighted, there is a shift to call research in this area patient safety research (but 
this term encompasses not only medication related processes, but other medical 
processes as well) or medication safety research if referring to medication related 
activities only.  
 
These two traditions of thought have different views on the causes of harm and 
hence different research methods. Within pharmacovigilance / 
pharmacodepidemiology the drug is seen as the cause of harm and there is little 
review of the process. Medication error researchers see the failure of the system as 
causes of harm and hence are interested in what people do.  
 
There is a body of research around inappropriate prescribing or drug related 
problems in primary and secondary care. There is some overlap between these 
terms and medication errors. Some of the events considered to be inappropriate 
prescribing could be also called medication errors and likewise medication errors can 
result in drug related problems. In general, research in the area of quality 
management is wider than medication error research. An in-depth review of the 
literature on inappropriate prescribing/drug related problems is outside the scope of 
the present report.  
 
  81 
Adverse 
drug 
reactions 
Iatrogenic 
harm 
Medication 
errors 
Shaded area 
denotes adverse 
drug events 
Figure 29: Relationships between medication errors and different types of 
iatrogenic injury (from 
50) 
 
Figure 29 is a graphical illustration of how we see the relationships between 
medication errors and different types of iatrogenic injury.
50 However, reviewing 
research reports, meta-analysis, literature reviews, and government documents we 
find that different meanings are attached to these terms. In the following we describe 
the different definitions and how they are understood and used in practice. The focus 
of this report is on medication errors. Therefore for terms such as adverse drug 
reactions we explore the extent to which these terms may also encompass 
medication errors.  
 
3.2 Definitions describing deviations from process of drug use 
Medication errors/patient safety incidents involving medicines 
Medication errors have been defined in many different ways. Some of the definitions 
relate to all types of medication errors, others relate to specific types of errors, eg. 
prescribing errors and administration errors. Reviewing the definition we find that 
these are either based on  
•  explicit criteria of what is considered erroneous 
•  implicit criteria based on expert judgement 
•  mix of explicit and implicit criteria  
 
  82Table 10 shows three definitions of medication errors which are frequently referred 
to. The first one was proposed by the US based National Coordinating Council for 
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP), an independent body 
comprised of 25 national and international organisations including the American 
Society of Health System Pharmacists.
51 This definition has been adopted by the 
NPSA 
15, but the NPSA uses the term “patient safety incident involving 
medicines” instead of medication error.  
 
 “A medication error is any preventable event that may cause or lead to 
inappropriate medication use or patient harm, while the medication is in the control 
of the health care professional, patient, or consumer. Such events may be related to 
professional practice, health care products, procedures, and systems including: 
prescribing; order communication; product labeling, packaging and nomenclature; 
compounding; dispensing; distribution; administration; education; monitoring; and 
use”. (http://www.nccmerp.org/aboutMedErrors.html accessed 18.10.2004 or 
http://www.npsa.nhs.uk/ accessed 15.08.2005) 
“Any error in the process of prescribing, dispensing or administering a drug”.
29;40  
“Errors occurring at any stage in the process of delivering a medication whether 
there are adverse consequences or not.”
52 
“The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong 
plan to achieve an aim”
53 (This is the definition of a human error, but has also been 
used as a definition of a medication error
54) 
Table 10: General definitions of medication errors 
 
The first three definitions listed in Table 10 emphasise that medication errors are 
related to the process of providing medication and (partly) stress that errors do not 
necessarily have to be associated with adverse patient consequences (in contrast to 
adverse drug reactions and adverse drug events). The first definition in Table 10 by 
the NCC MERP gives some characteristics of errors (preventable events of 
inappropriate medication use) and describes the circumstances where this 
medication use occurs. However, none of these definitions give any details of what is 
considered erroneous, thus all of them are based on implicit criteria. Terms such as 
'preventable event' and 'inappropriate medication use' are very broad (what is more, 
error is equated with inappropriateness – most would think these concepts different). 
Subjective judgment is required to distinguish between what is correct and what is an 
error. This relies heavily on the knowledge, views and attitudes of the individuals that 
  83judge the process and others may view the situation differently. Furthermore, in a lot 
of cases inappropriate medication use is not equivalent to a medication error. In 
summary, the first three definitions are circular, defining the 'medication' part rather 
than error.  
 
The last definition listed in Table 10 is the description of errors originating in human 
error theory,
23 which is adapted by the Institute of Medicine in the US as their 
definition of medical errors.
53 A recent study quoted this as their definition of a 
medication error.
54 However, it depends on what the 'aim' is. Much of the psychology 
of human error literature comes from studying workers in industrial settings. They 
often had a single aim. In medicine the 'aim' may be a contestable balance of 
different ends, such as respecting autonomy while protecting the public good.  
 
The definitions reviewed so far provide a general idea or description of medication 
errors, they do not provide sufficient detail to be used operationally to determine 
medication error rates. Even studies referring to the same definition are not 
necessarily comparable. Interpreting the results of studies using these broad 
definitions based on implicit criteria require careful review of the data collection 
methods and results to identify what was considered erroneous. This also highlights 
that the same act may or may not be judged an error depending on the 
circumstances, judges, healthcare system and culture. But there could be also an 
advantage of using an implicit definition of a medication error: processes of a diverse 
nature could be included which would be missed using explicit criteria.
55  
 
To obtain more detailed guidance about medication errors there is a need to focus on 
specific groups of errors such as prescribing errors and administration errors. In the 
following section we outline common definitions for these specific types of error.  
 
Prescribing errors 
Table 11 shows three commonly used definitions of prescribing errors. The first 
definition is one of the few examples of a definition which was based on a consensus 
method, suggested by Dean et al. 
56 This was consequently used in a number of 
studies identifying the prescribing error rates as well as their causes.
24;30;57-60 
Furthermore, it has been adopted in the report of the Department of Health “Building 
a safer NHS for patients – improving medication safety”.
15  
 
  84The definition by Dean et al. (first one in Table 11) provides information about the 
characteristics of an error: it is unintentional and needs to be of clinical significance. 
Furthermore, this definition sets as its reference point generally accepted practice. In 
the original paper Dean et al. 
56 also include examples to illustrate what is included 
and excluded as a prescribing error. 
 
 “A clinically meaningful prescribing error was defined as a prescribing decision or 
prescription writing process that results in an unintentional, significant reduction in 
the probability of treatment being timely and effective or increase in the risk of harm, 
when compared with generally accepted practice. Prescribing without taking into 
account the patient's clinical status, failure to communicate essential information, and 
transcription errors were all considered prescribing errors. However, failures to 
adhere to standards such as national guidelines or the drug's product license were 
not considered errors if this reflected accepted practice.”
56 
“Prescribing errors were defined as errors in the name, strength or dosage form of a 
drug, in the dosage, in the route of administration, in the instructions for use, in the 
length or therapy or in the combination with the other medication used by the patient. 
[…] Wrong indication was not included in the prescribing errors. […] A dosage was 
only considered to be too high when it exceeded the maximum dosage for all 
indications.”
61 
“An error was determined to have occurred when an order was found to be 
incomplete, incorrect, or inappropriate at the time of physician ordering.”
62 
Table 11: Definitions of prescribing errors 
 
Another definition for prescribing errors was used in a study by van den Bemt et al.
61 
(second definition in Table 11) This definition is circular – it defines “errors” as 
“errors” in the first six words. All it does is describe the scope of prescribing. Even the 
attempt to define an explicit standard for dosing errors is unclear – what does 
maximum dose refer to? The licensed dose – which can often be validly exceeded in 
practice? For example, it is accepted practice to prescribe doses of gentamicin which 
exceed the licensed dose for all indications. The last definition in Table 11 is also 
vague and ambiguous. What is the difference between an incorrect and an 
inappropriate prescription? The authors provide some more details about medication 
errors, but these are only partly helpful, for example “a wrong drug” is defined as an 
“incorrect drug ordered”.
62   
 
  85Finally there are many studies of prescribing errors that do not give explicit 
definitions, but which investigate the incidence of “inappropriate prescribing” or 
medication errors as judged by reviewing pharmacists and prescribing 
physicians.
31;63-65 Whilst this is a pragmatic approach, again it is subjective and is 
likely to lead to wide variation. 
 
Administration errors 
Table 12 shows common definitions of administration errors. A definition which has 
been widely used to describe administration errors in hospital is the first one in Table 
12: This was also the standard definition of a medication error adopted by the 
American Society of Hospital Pharmacists.
66 This is confusing, as this definition of a 
“medication error” specifically addresses medication administration errors. Obviously, 
this group of researchers refer to medication administration errors as medication 
errors.
67 Possibly this is because a lot of the early studies carried out by pharmacists 
in the United States, in particular by Barker and colleagues,
45 focused on medication 
administration errors.  
 
 “A medication error is a deviation from the prescriber’s handwritten or typed 
medication order or from the order that the prescriber had entered into the computer 
system.” 
67  
“A deviation in preparation and administration of a drug from a doctor’s prescription, 
the hospital’s intravenous policy, or the manufacturer’s instructions. The clinical 
appropriateness of the prescription was not assessed. All errors had to have the 
potential to adversely affect the patient, so deviations from hospital procedures, such 
as not checking name bands or not labeling infusions, were not considered as errors 
if the correct drug was given to the patient”.
25 
Table 12: Definitions of administration errors 
 
Similar definitions have been used to identify medication errors associated with the 
preparation and administration of intravenous medication in hospitals (second 
definition in Table 12). 
 
Both definitions of administration errors outline a clear standard (for example a 
doctor’s prescription) which is used to identify what is wrong. But even using these 
definitions the methods sections of papers have to be read carefully for further detail 
of what was included and excluded, for example whether deviations from prescribed 
  86time of administration, or not shaking a bottle of liquid medication, were considered 
as a source of error. But we also find numerous studies that do not include sufficient 
details to understand which types of errors were studied.
54;68;69  
 
Furthermore, whilst the definition for intravenous drug administration errors  
25 states 
that errors had to have the potential to adversely affect the patient, other studies also 
included deviations from processes which do not directly affect patient safety. For 
example, a study on intravenous drug errors included cases where nurses did not 
wear protective gloves when preparing antibiotics. However, this is recommended to 
prevent staff from developing allergies against the antibiotics.
37 Therefore, deviating 
from the standard would not affect patient safety.  
 
3.3 Redefining the term “medication error” in practice 
So far we have found a wide range of different definitions of medication errors in 
policy documents and research, but there are several studies showing an even 
greater variation in how the term medication error is defined and understood in 
practice. Ethnographic research investigated the criteria nurses used to decide 
whether an incident was a “real” error and consequently had to be reported through 
the medication error reporting scheme operated in the hospital.
70 For example, 
nurses did not regard incidents as medication errors if they were not their “fault”. This 
included cases in which a drug was not administered, because it was not available 
on the ward or the patient was absent from his or her room which would be an 
omission error according to most definitions quoted above. Similar “redefining” 
strategies were found in a study interviewing hospital pharmacists.
71 For example, if 
prescribing errors were detected by the pharmacists and resolved in the pharmacy 
department they were named “interventions” and not reported via the medication 
error reporting system. Interviews with doctors about their prescribing errors also 
suggested that such incidents were not always interpreted as errors.
24 
 
Our review so far has shown that there is no generally agreed definition of a 
medication error. Most definitions are based on implicit criteria which are open to 
wide interpretation. This makes it difficult to compare study results. 
 
3.4 Definitions describing harmful events and the role of medicines in its cause 
Adverse drug reaction 
Commonly used definitions for adverse drug reactions are listed in Table 13. The 
most widely used definition of an adverse drug reaction is that of the World Health 
  87Organisation (WHO) which was originally published in 1972 
72 and with a slight 
modification is still in use.
73;74 
 
Comments in the WHO documents emphasise that this definition includes all doses 
prescribed clinically, but is intended to exclude accidental or deliberate overdose. 
There is no further reference made to differentiate adverse drug reactions from 
medication errors.  
 
However, there is diversity in how the WHO definition is understood in this respect. 
Some studies and meta-analyses on adverse drug reactions (explicitly referencing 
the WHO definition) have included data on medication errors.
75-77 The NPSA also 
included adverse drug reactions as one type of “patient safety incident involving 
medicine” (i.e., medication error) as can be seen from the National Reporting and 
Learning System.
78 In contrast other authors conducting similar studies excluded 
data on medication errors, explicitly stating that adverse drug reactions were not due 
to medication errors.
52;79;80 Irey 
81 mixed events that were adverse drug reactions as 
defined by the WHO with events which would not fall within the WHO definition,  for 
example 'lethal adverse drug reactions involving diagnostic or therapeutic error'. 
Other authors have used their own terminology. The Boston Collaborative Drug 
Surveillance Program of Boston University defined adverse reactions as “undesired 
or unintended effect of a drug” including “deliberate or accidental overdosage and 
reactions to illicit drug use”.
82;83 A recent document by the World Health Organisation 
73 also suggests that pharmacovigilance centres, traditionally focused on collecting 
and analysing reports of adverse reactions to drugs, include reports of adverse 
reactions due to overdoses and medication errors. Medication errors are also 
addressed in publications of pharmacovigilance centres.
84-87 Interestingly, the recent 
report issued by the Chief Pharmaceutical Officer in the UK suggests that harmful 
medication errors were considered to be adverse drug reactions.
15 
 
Recently Edwards and Aronson 
88 suggested a modified definition of an adverse drug 
reaction which is intended to include reactions due to medication errors (second 
definition in Table 13). Furthermore, they emphasised that reactions due to 
contaminants (e.g., in herbal medicines) also needed to be considered. Finally, they 
found the term “noxious” too vague and not suitable to differentiate sufficiently 
between very minor and harmful reactions.  
 
 
  88 
 
 “An adverse reaction to a drug is one that is noxious, is unintended, and occurs at 
doses normally used in man for the prophylaxis, diagnosis, or therapy of disease, or for 
the modification of physiological function.”
72 
“An appreciably harmful or unpleasant reaction, resulting from an intervention related to 
the use of a medicinal product, which predicts hazard from future administration and 
warrants prevention or specific treatment, or alteration of the dosage regimen, or 
withdrawal of the product.”
88  
“An adverse drug reaction (ADR) is an unwanted or harmful reaction experienced 
following the administration of a drug or combination of drugs and is suspected to be 
related to the drug. The reaction may be a known side effect of the drug or it may be a 
new previously unrecognised ADR.” 
(http://medicines.mhra.gov.uk/ourwork/monitorsafequalmed/yellowcard/whattoreport.htm  
accessed 15.8.2005) 
Table 13: Definitions of adverse drug reactions 
 
 
Although the authors intend to include medication errors, this definition would 
suggest that only certain types of medication errors are included. It excludes 
medication errors which did not cause harmful reactions as well as errors which 
involve the absence of a drug, such as omissions or underdosing.  
 
A very similar definition to the ones already presented is the current definition of an 
adverse drug reaction used by the UK Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA) (third definition in Table 13). There is no comment 
available that would suggest whether or not medication errors are considered to be 
included as a source of adverse drug reactions – the definition could be read in either 
way at present. As has been already highlighted, some of the documents that are 
published by the MHRA would suggest that they also receive reports of medication 
errors.  
 
The above reviewed definitions of adverse drug reactions suggest that there is a shift 
in the area of pharmacovigilance to extend the "traditional" definition of an adverse 
drug reaction and include (certain types of) medication errors as a source of adverse 
drug reaction. This refinement in the understandings of pharmacovigilance needs to 
  89be reviewed as it is bringing together different traditions of thought, something 
difficult to achieve well.  
 
3.5 Difference and overlap between medication errors and adverse drug 
reactions 
Whether or not medication errors are regarded as a source of adverse drug 
reactions, in practice it is sometimes difficult to classify an event clearly as one or the 
other. Therefore we have left an area of overlap between the two in Figure 29. We 
would like to illustrate this using the example of a patient who experienced allergic 
shock after the administration of penicillin. If this patient was known to be allergic to 
penicillin, it would be a medication error as this drug should have not been prescribed 
for the patient. If it was not known, it would be an adverse drug reaction. But in 
practice, it may not always be as easy to decide whether or not an error had occurred 
(Did the doctor forget to ask the patient about the allergy? Did someone forget to 
document the allergy in the patient's notes? Did the prescriber not check the notes? 
etc). 
  
Apart from such practical issues of knowing whether or not an error had occurred we 
can also hypothesise that some events which are classified as adverse drug 
reactions today, may become medication errors in the future. For example, 
pharmacogenetic testing can be used to predict to what extent a patient metabolises 
certain drugs (e.g. distinguishes between slow, normal and fast metabolisers). This 
information can then be used to find the most suitable dose for this patient and 
prevent adverse reactions due to slow metabolisers being given a normal dose, 
which for them is an overdose. However, such techniques are not yet standard 
practice therefore not individualising the dosing regimen in this way cannot be 
regarded as an error. 
 
Using these examples, the main difference between adverse drug reactions and 
medication errors is the extent to which such reactions can be prevented. As the 
second example on pharmacogenetic technologies suggests, preventability depends 
on the standard of care that is available and possible.  
 
Related terms  
The term adverse drug reaction is well established today,
89;90 but a review of papers 
and books published in the 1960s and 1970s shows that a range of other terms have 
also been used. For example, one of the pioneers of pharmacovigilance, the 
  90physician L. Meyler, referred to “side effects”. He established the series “Side effects 
of drugs” which continues to be published today. Reviewing the editorials of early 
editions of the series shows that other terms that were considered at the time include 
“untoward side effect”,
91 “hypersensitivity to drugs” and “unwanted effects of drugs”.
92  
 
Finally, many authors do not provide a clear definition of what exactly they studied. 
For example Caranasos and colleagues 
93;94 published two studies on drug related 
events which used terms such as “drug-induced illnesses” and “adverse drug 
reactions” without providing a clear definition. They included adverse drug reactions 
(as defined by WHO) as well as events that seemed to have been due to errors. 
 
3.6 Adverse drug event 
The definition of an adverse drug event that is widely referred to is the one by Bates 
and colleagues of the Adverse Drug Event Prevention Study Group
40. Studies carried 
out by Bates and colleagues identified harmful events that were possibly associated 
with drug use. Cases in which a causal relationship between drug use and harmful 
event could be established were called adverse drug events. The following definition 
was used:   
 
“an injury resulting from medical intervention related to a drug” 
40 
 
or  
 
“injuries that result from the use of a drug”.
29 
 
Adverse drug events are then further classified. In one of the group’s first studies 
they classified the incidents into adverse drug reactions (WHO definition) and other 
incidents.
80 Later studies from the same group differentiated between non-
preventable adverse drug events which are adverse drug reactions and preventable 
adverse drug events which are due to medication errors (for example in studies 
29;40;47). Thus preventable adverse drug events are medication errors which actually 
resulted in patient harm (excluding harmless errors). In some studies Bates and 
colleagues also include the category of potential adverse drug events. These are 
medication errors with the potential to harm the patient, but in this particular case no 
harm occurred (either due to lucky circumstances or because the error was 
prevented before reaching the patient). 
29;40;47 Other studies refer to such events as 
“near misses”. In recent studies by the same group the term ameliorable adverse 
  91drug event is also used. These are events which are not preventable, but whose 
severity or duration could have been substantially reduced had different actions been 
taken.
95  
 
In summary, medication errors as defined by Bates' group have two main 
characteristics; they are harmful and they are preventable. Both of these 
characteristics are determined by subjective judgement. The level of harm they 
included is not defined, but remains the subjective judgement of the investigators. In 
contrast, a study which identified adverse events in medicine (including adverse drug 
events) defined harm as “measurable disability at discharge or increased length of 
stay due to the event”.
96 
 
There are numerous other studies which adopt the usage of these definitions of 
adverse drug events established by Bates and colleagues.
97-100 But again, methods 
and results sections have to be carefully reviewed to identify what events were 
studied. For example, Classen and colleagues also use the term adverse drug event 
in their studies, but they define adverse drug events using the WHO definition of an 
adverse drug reaction.
101;102 However, careful review of their data suggest that they 
included incidents that were adverse drug reactions (as defined by WHO) as well as 
harmful medication errors.  
 
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) uses the term adverse drug event for 
their spontaneous post-marketing surveillance system.
103 However, the aim of this 
program is to gain information about adverse drug reactions, but not medication 
errors. For example, on their website health care professionals can choose whether 
to report “adverse events” or “medication errors”. For the latter they are then 
redirected to another website (http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/report/hcp.htm).  
 
3.7 Adverse event 
The term adverse event is mainly used in the context of clinical trials (pre- and post-
marketing). According to the guidelines of good clinical practice, all adverse events 
that occur to patients during a clinical trial have to be recorded. The main feature is 
that there does not have to be a causal relationship between drug and the incident, 
which is in contrast to adverse drug reactions, adverse drug events and medication 
errors.  
Adverse events are defined by the World Health Organisation as:  
 
  92“any untoward medical occurrence that may present during treatment with a 
medicine but which does not necessarily have a causal relationship with this 
treatment”.  
 
This is very similar to the definition issued by the European Agency for the Evaluation 
of Medicinal Products as an international standard on clinical safety data 
management for reporting of drug-related incidents pre- and post-marketing.
89;90  
 
“Any untoward medical occurrence in a patient or clinical investigation subject 
administered a pharmaceutical product and which does not necessarily have to 
have a causal relationship with this treatment.”  
 
The term adverse event is also sometimes used for reports that are submitted to 
pharmacovigilance centres before formally assessing the likelihood of a causal 
relationship between event and drug exposure.
74;103 
 
Unfortunately, the terms adverse event and adverse drug event sound very similar 
and therefore in practice (and in publications) they may be mixed up or used as 
synonyms, although as shown above their meanings are quite different.  
 
3.8 Near miss incidents 
Another term which is often used in the context of medication errors or adverse drug 
events is “near miss incidents” or “close calls”. There is also a range of definitions 
and descriptions for these terms and most of these do not refer specifically to 
medication errors, but to other adverse events in medicine and elsewhere. Mainly 
these are used in the context of error/adverse event reporting systems (Table 14). 
 
In summary, the definitions suggest that near misses include errors which did not 
reach the patient, but had potential to harm the patient. The level of harm required to 
differentiate between a “near miss” and a “real error” is not specified. Likewise, it is 
not always clear whether medication errors which do not have the potential to cause 
harm to patients, for example the erroneous administration of two vitamin tablets 
instead of one, would be also called a near miss. The definition of the UK 
Department of Health suggests that such cases are included as a near miss. 
 
 
 
  93 
  
Near miss: UK Department of Health, "Building a safer NHS - improving medication 
safety":
15 
“Medication errors that do not result in patient harm or errors with the potential for 
harm but detected before they reach the patient” 
104 
Near miss: UK Department of Health, “An organisation with a memory”:
105  
"A situation in which an event or omission, or a sequence of events or omissions, 
arising during clinical care fails to develop further, whether or not as the result of 
compensating action, thus preventing injury to a patient” 
105 
Near miss: Institute of Medicine in the USA "Achieving a new standard for care":
106 
“An error of commission or omission that could have harmed the patient, but serious 
harm did not occur as a result of chance (e.g., the patient received a contraindicated 
drug but did not experience an adverse drug reaction), prevention (e.g., a potentially 
lethal overdose was prescribed, but a nurse identified the error before administering 
the medication), or mitigation (e.g., a lethal drug overdose was administered but 
discovered early and countered with an antidote)” 
106. 
Close call: “Close call – is an event or situation that could have resulted in an 
adverse event but did not, either by chance or through timely intervention.” 
107 
Table 14: Definitions of a 'near miss' or 'close call'  
 
 
3.9 Summary 
This review shows the diversity of definitions to describe risks associated with 
medication use. Definitions are interpreted and used differently and contradictory use 
was identified. The following issues were identified:   
 
•  A broad range of definitions are used for medication errors and few definitions 
provide clear information about what is considered erroneous (explicit 
criteria), relying on subjective judgment (implicit criteria) 
•  Standards of care have an impact on the definition of a medication error and 
changing standards may change the definition of what is considered 
erroneous 
•  There is no agreement regarding whether or not “adverse drug reactions” 
may include causation by medication errors 
  94•  Most authors use the term adverse drug event to describe all types of 
medication related harm, but others use the term adverse drug event as a 
synonym for adverse drug reaction (excluding medication errors) 
•  Adverse drug event is the term that is used to encompass all harmful events 
that occur to patients whilst they take medication, but there is no clear 
definition of what degree of harm is considered harmful  
•  Some studies do not provide sufficient detail about the definitions used to 
measure drug related harm/risks 
 
We recognise that the two different schools of thought (pharmacovigilance and 
medication error research community) approach the topic of drug safety from two 
different perspectives (individual drugs versus system of drug use). There is an 
overlap in interest of researching certain types of risks of drugs. This may be 
fruitful, but contains the risk of causing friction, because of different research 
traditions, methods and last but not least also terminology in understanding each 
other. 
  954. A review of commonly used methods to determine medication error rates 
This section is based on the paper by Franklin et al. 
50, due to be published in Drug 
Safety in 2005 (we are awaiting copyright permission to include parts of the article in 
this section). We include it here so the Chapter gives a rounded view of the variability 
that results from definitions and methods. 
 
Many different methodologies are available for studying errors and adverse events, 
and each has its respective strengths and limitations.
108 In the following section we 
outline the main approaches used to identify medication error rates and highlight the 
strengths and limitations of these methods. 
 
Studies of medication errors may be classified according to whether they focus on 
outcome or process, and whether study designs are retrospective or prospective 
(Table 15). We now consider each of these in turn. 
 
  Prospective  Retrospective 
Outcome based  Daily review of patient 
medical notes and asking 
staff for potential reports of 
harm 
40 
Retrospective review of 
medical notes 
109 or death 
certificates 
110 
Process based  Pharmacist review of 
medication orders during 
prescription monitoring 
111  
Self reporting 
48  
Observation of drug 
administration 
25 
Retrospective review of 
medication orders 
112 
Table 15: Different types of medication error studies, with an example of a 
study of each type. 
 
 
4.1 Outcome-based studies 
Such studies are based on identifying actual patient harm.  Most studies that fall into 
this category have included many different kinds of iatrogenic injury as well as 
medication errors.  However, depending how the data are presented, the frequency 
of medication error-related events can sometimes be determined.  Data collection 
can be either retrospective or prospective. 
 
  96 
Retrospective studies of outcome 
The Harvard Medical Practice study 
96 is probably the most well known retrospective 
study of iatrogenic harm; this US-based medical notes based review suggested that 
adverse drug events occurred in 0.7% of inpatients. A more recent US study 
113 
suggests a similar figure of 0.6%. However, these figures include adverse drug 
reactions, as well as medication errors, and the published results do not allow 
differentiation between them. From a UK study using similar methodology,
114 it can 
be estimated that preventable medication-related harm (ie harm due to medication 
errors) occurred in 0.8% of admissions. However, some doubts have been cast over 
the validity and reliability of the assessment of preventability in such studies.
115 
Furthermore, since the medical notes used as a data source were originally created 
for a different purpose, inadequacies in documentation could result in both false 
negative and false positive results.   
 
Another approach to retrospective data collection is to use “triggers” such as the 
results of laboratory tests or medication prescribed that may indicate that an error 
has occurred. Data collection may be manual 
116;117 or computerised.
118 However, the 
studies carried out to date focus on adverse drug events in general, and the results 
are not sufficiently detailed to allow differentiation between prescribing errors, other 
types of medication error, and adverse drug reactions. Furthermore, this 
methodology has not been fully validated and the percentage of all events that can 
be identified using this method is not yet known. When the real number of errors is 
low, it is easy for tests with low sensitivity and specificity to generate more false than 
true alerts.
119 
 
Few studies have reviewed death certificates to identify the medication error related 
death rate 
120 or drug related death rate.
121 These studies depend on correct 
identification and documentation of medication related deaths and are therefore likely 
to be an underestimate. But they are a powerful reminder that medication errors can 
cause death and provide valuable information about high risk medication. 
 
Prospective studies of outcome 
Prospective approaches potentially offer a more rigorous and robust approach 
without some of the biases associated with retrospective review. Prospective studies 
allow additional checking and investigation that is not possible in retrospective 
reviews that may be carried out months or years later. 
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The US-based Adverse Drug Event (ADE) Prevention Study Group carried out a 
prospective study to examine medication-related harm in more detail.
40 ADEs 
included all types of medication errors that resulted in harm, as well as adverse drug 
reactions; ADEs were identified using self-reporting by practitioners and daily medical 
record review by researchers.  It was concluded that medication errors caused harm 
in 1.8% of inpatients, of which prescribing accounted for the majority (1.0% of all 
inpatients).  This approach is likely to be more comprehensive than retrospective 
methods; however, there are no studies that directly compare the two.  As has been 
highlighted, definitions of harm also vary. For example, in the Harvard Medical 
Practice study,
96 harm was defined
 as “measurable disability at discharge or 
increased length of
 stay due to the event”. This study therefore included only events
 
that resulted in more serious levels of harm. The ADE
 Prevention Study Group did 
not define the level of harm they
 included, but suggest that “all” ADEs were studied; 
only 8%
 of the ADEs they identified met the definition used in the Harvard
 study.
40 
 
Computer-based 
40;122-124 systems have also been developed to prospectively screen 
for ADEs, including preventable ADEs (medication errors), using similar triggers to 
those used in the retrospective methods described above. Prospective screening 
means that preventative action can be taken. However, in general, the results of 
published studies are not sufficiently detailed to report the medication error rates. 
 
In outcome-based studies, only those errors that reach the patient and result in injury 
are included. The advantage of this approach is that only the errors that actually 
cause harm are included, removing the need to estimate the potential clinical 
significance of an event. However, the disadvantage is that errors that do not result in 
harm, either due to the intervention of another health care professional or due to 
sheer good fortune, are not included. This means that these errors cannot be learnt 
from. This is in contrast to the next type of study, those based on the process of 
prescribing and administering medication to the patient. The majority of studies in this 
field generally focus on one type of error, either prescribing or administration errors. 
 
4.2 Process-based studies: Prescribing errors 
These studies are based on health care professionals, usually pharmacists, 
reviewing prescriptions to identify prescribing errors. While such studies may be 
retrospective or prospective in design, the majority are prospective. Since 
pharmacists prospectively identifying prescribing errors will generally draw these to 
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the patient receives any medication, or before many doses have been received. 
There are therefore few actual adverse outcomes. The majority of studies have been 
carried out in secondary care. 
 
Retrospective studies of process 
Twenty-five years ago, Tesh et al.
112 carried out a retrospective review of drug charts 
and medical notes in three wards in a UK hospital.  It was concluded that 3.6% of all 
medication orders were associated with an error in drug use; these included errors in 
dose and frequency, route of administration and potential drug interactions. In 
addition, there were errors in prescription writing (such as use of brand names and 
spelling errors) in 7.9% of the medication orders studied. However, the definitions 
used are very broad, including prescribing by brand name, and the results cannot 
easily be compared with more recent studies.  
 
Prospective studies of process 
Studies show that US pharmacists prospectively reviewing medication orders in the 
course of their prescription monitoring duties identify (and prevent) prescribing errors 
in 0.3 to 1.9% of all orders written.
63-65;111 However, careful examination of these 
studies reveals some variation in the definitions used and comparisons amongst 
them should be made with caution. As one of the most prolific authors in this area 
points out, some of the error rates quoted are also likely to be an underestimate of 
the true error rate, as many errors will go undetected by the dispensary-based 
pharmacists who collected the majority of these data.
63 A study in paediatric 
inpatients used similar data collection methods to those used by the ADE Prevention 
Study Group, but included all medication errors instead of only those that resulted in 
harm.
29 In this study, a prescribing error was identified in 40.5% of admissions, or 
4.2% of medication orders written.   
 
There have been fewer studies outside of the United States. Several prospective UK 
studies have studied pharmacists’ clinical interventions.
125;126 However, such studies 
do not allow firm conclusions to be drawn regarding the frequency of prescribing 
errors, as pharmacists’ interventions may be for many other reasons, such as advice 
giving, formulary issues and patient counselling.  
 
In a more recent study, pharmacists prospectively identified prescribing errors in UK 
hospital inpatients 
30 using a standard definition of a prescribing error.
56 This study 
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serious prescribing error in 0.4%.
30 All of these were identified by pharmacists during 
routine monitoring and were rectified. 
 
In another UK study, Haw and Stubbs 
58 examined prescribing errors in a psychiatric 
hospital and concluded that an error occurred in 2.2% of all prescription items 
checked. This denominator is different to the number of medication orders written, 
which is the denominator used in other studies; results are therefore not directly 
comparable.  
 
Sagripanti et al.
57 studied prescribing errors in a cohort of 76 elective surgery patients 
who were followed from pre-operative assessment clinic to discharge in a UK 
hospital.  Prescribing errors were found in 36% of medication orders written on 
admission, in 3% written during the inpatient stay, and 27% written at discharge. The 
latter were generally the omission from the electronic discharge prescription of 
medication that patients reported having supplies of at home. Other studies focus 
specifically on the admission process, with studies suggesting that unintentional 
discrepancies in medication history taking occur in up to 65% of all patients.
127  
 
4.3 Process-based studies: Administration errors 
The majority of research to identify administration errors are prospective studies 
based on observation of nurses during the administration process. Administration 
errors are in general defined as deviations of administered medication from 
prescribed medication. These are identified by an observer, often a pharmacist, 
recording details of administered medication and comparing this with the original 
prescription of the physician. Barker and colleagues have been one of the first 
groups to use this method extensively in various studies in the US beginning in the 
1960s.
128  
 
A review of UK studies showed that medication administration error rates associated 
with oral medication on general wards range between 3% and 8%.
129 Most of these 
studies excluded intravenous drug errors. Recent studies reported errors rates 
between13% and 84% observing preparation and administration of intravenous 
drugs.
25;37;130-132 Studies which focussed on administration errors in intensive care 
observed similar high error rates.
36;38 As observers often prevent serious errors from 
reaching the patient, little is known about the actual outcome of errors. Relatively few 
studies have used methods to assess the potential outcome of the errors.
33;35;133 
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few administration errors had the potential to harm the patient,
32;36;134 whereas, 1-3% 
of administered intravenous doses were associated with a potentially serious harmful 
error.
25;34 It has often been suggested that the presence of the observer may change 
the behaviour of the observed. But several studies have assessed the reliability and 
validity of the observation methods and found that the presence of the observer 
seems to have little impact on the error rate.
45;135 In addition, human error theory 
suggest that in most categories of error the person would not know they were making 
an error and hence could not alter their behaviour. However, it remains likely that 
error rates reported using this method will be a conservative estimate. 
 
In one study, dosing errors were identified by analysing the concentration of 
intravenous infusions of acetylcysteine.
136 Errors were due to calculation mistakes, 
major errors in drawing up the drug and inadequate mixing of infusions. But such 
methods are difficult to use across a wide range of different drugs, are restricted to 
intravenous medication and some types of errors, such as the omission of prescribed 
medication are less likely to be detected. Other methods such as chart review and 
incident reporting were found to be unsuitable to measure medication administration 
error rates.
137  
 
4.4 Other methods 
Studies based on self reporting of errors 
2;138;139 can also be classified as prospective 
and in general do not focus on a particular type of medication error. However, the 
extent and nature of what is reported is likely to vary widely depending on the nature 
of the reporting system, the organisational culture, how easy it is to report and other 
factors. Reporting systems can be used to highlight commonly reported problems, 
and serve an important function in raising awareness and enhancing safety. It is 
important to be aware that the data cannot be used to obtain quantitative estimates 
of error rates due to the gross under-reporting that is known to occur.
122;128;140;141 
 
4.5 Denominators 
Studies differ in the denominators used to calculate the error rate.  Denominators that 
have been used include hospital admissions,
109 patient days,
126 prescriptions or 
medication orders written,
30 number of medication orders checked by pharmacists,
58 
number of observed drug administrations plus medication that was prescribed but 
then omitted,
25 number of medication administration interventions.
38 It has been 
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have a dramatic influence on the error rate calculated.
32 
 
4.6 Summary  
A range of methods are used to study the frequency of medication errors. Key issues 
are whether studies should focus on process or on outcome and whether methods 
should be retrospective or prospective.  
•  Process-based studies potentially allow all errors to be identified giving scope 
for the identification of trends and learning opportunities, but may be criticized 
for focusing on many minor errors unlikely to have resulted in patient harm. 
Alternatively, process-based studies should include a measure of potential 
patient harm. 
•  Outcome-based studies are likely to identify areas with most patient harm 
•  Retrospective studies may miss errors, because of lack of documentation and 
lack of real time information on clinical status of the patient.  
•  Extreme caution is needed when comparing frequencies of medication error 
rates identified using different methods.  
•  More work is needed to explore the reliability and validity of the different 
research methods 
•  There is a lack of standard reporting methods in research papers 
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Medication errors range from those with very serious consequences to those that 
have little or no impact on the patient. The main focus is on preventing the former 
and therefore methods are needed to differentiate between (potentially) harmful and 
harmless errors. In this section we review the literature on methods used to assess 
the (potential) outcome of medication errors and highlight their strengths and 
limitations.   
 
Studies can be broadly divided into those that estimate the potential outcome (as 
actual patient harm remains unknown) and those that provide information on actual 
patient outcome. As we have already highlighted, in prospective process-based 
studies on prescribing or administration errors the researchers often prevent the 
medication errors reaching the patient and therefore data about the outcome of the 
patient may not be available (for example 
25;30). 
 
5.1 Methods to estimate potential outcome  
Methods that have been used to estimate potential outcome can be broadly divided 
into those based on subjective assessment and those based on proxy indicators.  
 
Methods based on subjective assessment 
Subjective assessment relies on one or more experts judging the likely outcome of 
the error identified. Studies vary in their choice of experts and the number of experts 
that are asked to judge the errors. Studies have used one,
38 two 
30;37 or more experts 
64;137 or an unknown number of experts.
31;63;111 Experts that have been asked to judge 
the medication errors include (clinical/hospital) pharmacists,
36;37;142  
pharmacologists, 
30 physicians 
38;137 and nurses.
35;143 None of the studies included 
patients. Several studies used different health care professionals to assess the 
errors. For example, a physician and two pharmacists,
64 a clinical pharmacist and a 
pharmacologist.
30 Few studies provide some detail about what the experts should 
take into account when judging the cases. For example Allan et al.
137 stated that 
information on the patient’s condition, the drug concerned and the frequency of the 
error should be considered. 
 
Several studies provided estimates of agreement between two or more independent 
assessors. These ranged between good 
144  moderate 
145 and low inter-rater 
reliability.
40;95 Only few studies have formally validated this approach, that is 
determined how many experts and the type of health care professional needed to get 
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showed that for medication administration errors, the mean score of four health care 
professionals judging the potential clinical significance of an error on a scale between 
0 (representing no harm) and 10 (representing death) gives a valid and reliable 
estimate of the potential clinical significance of the error.
33 Part of the validation 
process showed that the expert’s judgement of potential severity was similar to the 
true outcome for a subset of medication errors with known outcome. The judges 
should preferably include one doctor, one pharmacist and one nurse. This method 
has consequently been validated for use in Germany 
35 and has been used in several 
observation-based studies on medication administration errors in the UK and in 
Germany.
25;32;34 
 
Folli et al.
64 used a different approach giving details about the errors for each level of 
harm. For example, potentially lethal errors included cases “when the dose of a drug 
with a very low therapeutic index is too high (10 times the normal dose)”. 
Unfortunately, no further detail is provided about the basis of this list and whether this 
was validated, for example using “real cases of adverse outcome”.  
 
Categories of  potential outcome 
The potential outcome has been categorised very differently. Table 16 gives an 
overview of the systems and categories that have been used. Other studies used 
categorisations that were developed to categorise actual patient outcome.
36 
 
It can be argued that judging the potential outcome of medication errors should take 
into account the extent of harm that may potentially occur as well as the probability of 
this harm occurring. This would require two dimensional measures.
33 However, none 
of the existing methods allow both of these dimensions to be expressed explicitly.  
 
Authors   Categories  Examples of categories 
Allan Flynn et al. 
137 2  Potentially  clinically 
significant; not significant 
Dean et al. 
30  2  Potentially serious; not 
serious 
Dean et al. 
33  3  Severe; moderate; minor 
Folli et al. 
64  4  Potentially fatal or severe; 
potentially serious; 
potentially significant; 
problem orders  
Table 16: Systems to categorise potential outcome of medication errors 
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These methods typically consider objective measures such as the type of error or the 
type of drug involved, and attempt to relate these to the severity of the medication 
error. For example, one of the first studies on medication administration errors used 
as an indicator of severity the therapeutic classification of the drugs involved;
45 the 
same approach was subsequently adopted by Hynniman et al.
146 and Tisdale.
147 In 
these studies, therapeutic classifications of the American Hospital Formulary Service 
were reviewed to identify those containing drugs that were likely to be associated 
with serious effects if given incorrectly. Drugs in the serious category included those 
affecting the central nervous system, antibiotics and cardiovascular drugs. Drugs in 
the “not serious category” included gastrointestinal drugs, vitamins and vaccines. The 
validity of this method is limited by the many exceptions to the broad therapeutic 
classifications. For example, the intravenous administration of a vaccine (intended for 
intramuscular use) may have more serious consequences than the administration of 
a nifedipine capsule instead of a nifedipine slow release tablet. Other instruments 
were developed in the USA to standardise the level of disciplinary action taken 
against nurses involved in medication errors. They contain multiple items, the scores 
for which are summed to given an overall index of severity. For example, Tyndall and 
Carlson 
148 included type of drug, type of medication error, route of administration, 
and patient’s condition. Dean et al.
149 developed a scoring instrument which included 
items on the legal status of the drug, the therapeutic index, use outside the license, 
number of repetitions of the medication errors in one patient. This instrument is 
relatively quick and simple to use. In contrast to previous methods they extensively 
assessed the reliability and validity of this method. Although the method was found to 
be reliable and valid to differentiate between minor and significant outcome it was not 
suitable to differentiate adequately between moderate and severe cases of 
medication errors. Validity has not been assessed for other scales that are available 
in the literature and therefore it remains of concern whether methods based on proxy 
indicators are suitable as a true measure of potential outcome.  
 
5.2 Categorisation of actual outcome 
Prospective or retrospective outcome-based studies provide information about the 
consequences of medication errors for the patient. Different methods have been 
used to categorise the level of harm. Table 17 shows an overview of commonly used 
categorisation systems.  
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31;63;111;150 2  Nonserious;  serious 
47;151  3  Significant; serious; fatal or life threatening 
102  3  Mild; moderate; severe 
78  4  Low, moderate, severe, death 
133 9  See  Table 18
Table 17: Different systems to categorise actual patient outcome of medication 
errors/adverse drug events 
 
A classification referred to widely is that of the US National Coordinating Council for 
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP). It is used for their 
nationwide reporting system as well as by other reporting systems in the US (United 
States Pharmacopeia and Institute of Safe Medication Practices) and in other 
countries.
152;153 It defines nine categories with the anchors of “No error: 
Circumstances or events that have the capacity to cause error” and “An error 
occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in the patient’s death” (Table 18). 
Harm is defined as temporary or permanent impairment of the physical, emotional, or 
psychological function or structure of the body and/or pain resulting there from 
requiring intervention. However, this classification system is misleading as it attempts 
to cover two aspects: Did an error occur at all? (category A versus all other 
categories) and What are the consequences of the error? (categories C - H).  
 
Other classification systems shown in Table 17 use only two or three categories. A 
wide range of terms is used to describe the different levels of harm. It is difficult to 
compare across different studies as the same term may refer to different levels of 
harm. For example, “serious” includes life-threatening events in one study,
150 but not 
in others 
40;47 which have a separate category of life-threatening events. Interestingly, 
the terms serious and severe have both been used for the most harmful category 
(Table 16, Table 17).  
 
In most studies, the outcome of the errors are categorised subjectively by one or 
more expert. Hardly any study provides details about the difference between the 
different levels of harm. Some studies provide estimates to what degree experts 
agreed on classification of the events. For example, studies carried out by Bates and 
colleagues 
29;40;47 usually use two experts to classify the outcome with good inter 
rater reliability. Other studies only use one individual or do not report any details on 
the categorisation process.
102 In such cases, the reliability of using these scales 
remains unknown.  
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NO ERROR 
Category A:  Circumstances or events that have the capacity to cause error 
 
ERROR, NO HARM 
Category B: An error occurred but the error did not reach the patient 
(An “error of omission” does reach the patient.) 
Category C: An error occurred that reached the patient, but did not cause 
patient harm 
Category D: An error occurred that reached the patient and required monitoring 
to confirm that it resulted in no harm to the patient and/or required 
intervention to preclude harm 
 
ERROR, HARM 
Category E: An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in 
temporary harm to the patient and required intervention 
Category F: An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in 
temporary harm to the patient and required initial or prolonged 
hospitalization 
Category G: An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in 
permanent patient harm 
Category H: An error occurred that required intervention necessary to sustain 
Life 
 
ERROR, DEATH 
Category I: An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in the 
patient’s death. 
 
Table 18: The NCC MERP categories for patient outcome 
133  
 
5.3 Summary  
•  It is important to differentiate between minor and severe outcomes of 
medication errors. More research is needed to develop reliable and valid 
methods to estimate potential patient outcome in studies which do not provide 
actual outcome data.  
•  There is no agreement about how harm is defined  
•  Different scales are used to categorise patient outcome which limits 
comparisons between study results 
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6. Summary  
In this Chapter, we have reviewed common definitions of medication errors and 
research methods to identify the frequency of medication errors and measure their 
severity. Our review shows: 
•  In medication error research there is a lack of generally agreed definitions for 
basic terms and widespread confusion and contradicting usage of terms and 
definitions 
•  Many research methods lack assessment of reliability and validity 
•  There is a poor standard of reporting of the details of methods and definitions 
in publications 
This means that comparisons between studies can only be made with great caution 
and the generalisability of many research results outside the study's institution is very 
limited.  
 
This has implications on the work which we presented in Chapter 0. We investigated 
currently available data to establish a Heinrich ratio for medication errors. The lack of 
standard definitions and available methods to assess the clinical impact of 
medication errors result in great uncertainty about the relationship between minor 
and more serious medication errors. 
 
The findings of this Chapter also have wider implications for medication error 
research. There is an urgent need for the development of a common international 
system for defining, classifying, measuring and reporting adverse events and “near 
misses”. The WHO has recently announced that it will initiate an international project 
on methods of intercountry comparisons to contribute to the development of a 
common international taxonomy in the area (http://www.who.int/patientsafety/en/).  
 
A first step in these efforts would be to improve the reporting of results in medication 
errors research through a consensus statement. Such efforts were very successful in 
the area of improving the quality of conducting and reporting results of clinical trials, 
in which use of the CONSORT Statement is standard.
43 In the coming years many 
resources nationally and internationally will be dedicated to patient safety research. A 
consensus statement could improve research and reporting of research enormously 
and thus the generalisability of the results. 
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